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The Big Crowd and the Small Enterprise: 




Equity crowdfunding is a financial innovation that allows small 
businesses and startups to access capital through soliciting investment 
over the Internet. The current literature on crowdfunding has focused on 
its theoretical background and on the development of crowdfunding 
exemptions from the securities laws permitting the practice. There is less 
discussion of the impact of crowdfunding on corporate governance. This 
article fills that gap by outlining the potential for a panoply of 
intracorporate disputes between and among majority shareholders and 
“crowd” minority shareholders, placing the discussion within the 
longstanding—if uneasy—divide in judicial treatment of disputes in 
public corporations and close corporations. From there, the article argues 
that courts adjudicating disputes in “close-but-crowdfunded” firms 
should adopt the contractual approach exemplified by Delaware law, and 
refrain from importing minority shareholder oppression doctrine into the 
crowdfunding context. The two primary justifications for providing 
special protections for close corporation minority shareholders are much 
weaker in the crowdfunding context. First, the mechanics of the 
crowdfunding process create both the incentive and opportunity to select 
appropriate terms upon which the founders will continue their 
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relationship and which will be offered to the crowd. Second, and 
similarly, that same process undermines the inference that there are 
unwritten, yet reasonable, expectations about any shareholder’s role in 
the venture. Furthermore, the application of oppression doctrine in the 
crowdfunded firm would ultimately harm crowd and non-crowd 
shareholders alike, while undermining the potential gains from equity 
crowdfunding as a new source of capital accumulation. 
Table of Contents 
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 413
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CROWDFUNDING ................................................. 420
A. Crowdfunding By Definition ....................................................... 420
B. Hurtling Toward Investment Crowdfunding: Debt and Equity .... 422
III. A SORT OF DIVIDE: INTRACORPORATE DISPUTES LARGE AND 
SMALL .................................................................................................. 425
A. The Public Corporation as the Paradigm of the Corporate 
Form ............................................................................................. 426
B. Close Corporations and the Blurring of the Roles ....................... 427
C. The Judicial and Legislative Response ........................................ 431
1. Heightened Fiduciary Duties.................................................. 432
2. Statutory Dissolution and Buyout Remedies ......................... 435
D. Non-Starters: Delaware and Texas ............................................... 438
E. How Close is Close? .................................................................... 443
F. Blurring Again: The Close-But-Crowdfunded Firm .................... 444
IV. DISPUTES IN CLOSE-BUT-CROWDFUNDED FIRMS SHOULD BE
TREATED LIKE BIG INVESTOR DISPUTES .............................................. 445
A. Close-But-Crowdfunded as a Significant Slice of Equity 
Crowdfunding Activity ................................................................ 446
B. Fitting in with the Crowd ............................................................. 448
C. Intracorporate Dispute Vignettes ................................................. 450
1. The Founders’ Quarrel ........................................................... 450
2. The Locked-in Crowd ............................................................ 452
3. The Loyal Employee .............................................................. 454
4. The Early Adopter .................................................................. 456
D. Resolving the Tension: Small Crowd Shareholders as Big 
Investors ....................................................................................... 459
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 461
2018] THE BIG CROWD AND THE SMALL ENTERPRISE 413 
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding is a disruptive financial and technological innovation 
that has drawn both excitement and skepticism.1 Together with its 
intuitive appeal to businesses in search of new sources of capital, its 
emergence as an investment mechanism has attracted the attention of 
lawmakers and regulators across the United States. Acting upon authority 
granted to it by the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS 
Act),2 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently finalized 
the first set of crowdfunding regulations, Regulation Crowdfunding.3
Likewise, many state legislatures have acted to permit intrastate sales of 
securities to Internet-based crowds.4 As entrepreneurs avail themselves 
of these securities law exemptions and begin experimenting with 
crowdfunding as a source of equity financing,5 disputes between and 
among founders and the crowd may lead to new varieties of 
intracorporate litigation. 
The emergence of equity crowdfunding arrives against the backdrop 
of an ongoing debate about whether, or to what extent, close corporations 
should be treated differently than public corporations.6 The defining 
traits of a public corporation are the clear separation between the 
identities and roles of the shareholders, officers, and directors, and the 
 1.  “Crowdfunding” refers to a broad range of activities that generally involve 
soliciting money for business or social ventures through Internet platforms or networks. 
See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S. 
Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 n.1 (2014). This article will focus on 
“securities” or “investment” crowdfunding, as opposed to “rewards-based” or “donation” 
crowdfunding. See infra Part II. 
 2.  See generally Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 
Stat. 306 (2012). The JOBS Act refers to Titles II, III, and IV of the Act, each of which 
opened a different avenue to crowdfunding. Id. §§ 201, 301–305, 401–402, 126 Stat. at 
313–15. In brief, Title II permits “general solicitation” over the Internet to accredited 
investors under Regulation D, while Title III permits solicitation to unaccredited 
investors. Id. §§ 201(a)(1), 302(a), 126 Stat. at 314–15. Title IV granted the SEC 
authority to create a tiered version of the prior Regulation A, named Regulation A+, that 
allowed for relatively larger offerings through crowdfunding portals to both accredited 
and unaccredited investors. Id. § 401(a), 126 Stat. at 323–24. 
 3.  Regulation Crowdfunding, 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100–.503 (2017); see also infra 
notes 82–85 and accompanying text.   
 4.  At least 34 states and the District of Columbia have state-level crowdfunding 
exemptions as of 2016. See N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N, INTRASTATE CROWDFUNDING 
UPDATE: NOVEMBER 16, 2016 2 (2016), http://nasaa.cdn.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/NASAA-Intrastate-Crowdfunding-Update-111616.pdf.  
 5.  See Heminway, supra note 1, at 477 n.1. This article assumes a sufficiently 
large number of entities will utilize some form of equity crowdfunding. As discussed 
later in this Part, there are several reasons crowdfunding may not be adopted widely. 
 6.  See generally Robert B. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contracts and 
Judges in the Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 (2011). 
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availability of a liquid market for the shares of the corporation’s stock.7
Minority shareholders in public corporations generally expect only 
dividends or appreciation in stock value and have little more than a 
passive role in corporate affairs.8 If an individual or group of minority9
shareholders are dissatisfied with corporate policies or performance, they 
can—and are expected to—exit the corporation by selling their shares.10
Close corporations are defined by a blending of the roles of 
shareholder, officer, and director; the close personal relationships 
between the players; and the lack of market for reselling shares.11
Minority shareholders in close corporations typically are not passive; 
often expect to be officers and directors; and expect to derive their 
financial participation from a salary or other payments for service as 
officers and directors.12 Appreciation in value is a remote consideration 
given the illiquid resale market, though in most cases, close corporation 
minority shareholders expect to participate in profits on similar terms as 
the majority.13
Both types of corporations utilize similar formal characteristics: the 
seat of power in both is the board of directors, which, in the absence of 
charter, bylaws, or agreements holding otherwise, makes all important 
decisions by majority vote.14 The close corporation minority shareholder 
faces a uniquely precarious position: a falling out between the majority 
and minority can result in the majority utilizing these formal powers of 
the corporation to diminish the role of the minority shareholder from full 
 7.  See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: 
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 888–
92 (2005).  
 8.  See generally Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely 
Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1102–04 (contrasting the close corporation 
shareholder to the public shareholder by noting that investors often receive salaries 
instead of dividends and that the minority “has great difficulty selling its stock to realize 
capital appreciation”). 
 9.  Professor Moll defines “majority” and “minority” shareholders simply as those 
shareholders who do and do not have control over the corporation. See Moll, supra note 
7, at 883 n.1. This article will use “majority” and “minority” in the same way. 
 10.  See Ragazzo, supra note 8, at 1103 (suggesting that one option for disaffected 
public shareholders is to sell their stock).   
 11.  See Moll, supra note 7, at 888–92. As discussed in Part III, the dividing line 
between “public” and “close” corporations is far from clear. See infra Section III.E. For 
purposes of this article, “public” corporations will refer to corporations with clear 
distinctions between the roles and expectations of shareholders, officers, and directors, 
while “close” corporations will refer to corporations with substantial overlap and 
interaction between those roles.  
 12.  See Moll, supra note 7, at 890–91. 
 13.  See Moll, supra note 7, at 888, 890 (describing close corporation shareholder 
expectations of participation in the business in addition to mere return on investment and 
payment of a salary in lieu of dividends as distributions of earnings).   
 14.  Id. at 889–90. 
2018] THE BIG CROWD AND THE SMALL ENTERPRISE 415 
management and financial participation to mere ownership of a 
completely illiquid equity interest.15
Courts and legislatures have grappled for some time with how to 
protect close corporation minority shareholders from the hard edge of 
such disputes.16 Their uneasy answer to the question includes two 
primary solutions: (1) awarding damages or equitable relief for the 
breach of a special, close corporation heightened fiduciary duty owed by 
the majority to the minority,17 or (2) ordering an involuntary dissolution 
of the corporation, a buyout of the oppressed minority shareholder, or 
some similar equity-style remedy premised on statutory authority.18 The 
standard for imposing a remedy under either theory typically is whether 
the court finds a material impairment of the minority shareholder’s
reasonable expectations regarding his or her investment.19 The 
justification for these solutions is twofold. First, courts note that personal 
relationships among founding players usually result in minority 
shareholders relying on trust instead of explicit contractual protections 
and forgoing the expense of hiring lawyers to negotiate such protections 
during the business’s planning phase.20 Second, in the absence of such 
contracting and the sophistication it suggests, courts have been willing to 
make inferences about parties’ reasonable expectations based upon the 
course of the parties’ dealings with one another.21 These circumstances 
are foreign to public corporations because of the clear functional 
distinctions between shareholders and those in control—by the time the 
corporation is large or public, courts no longer view minority 
shareholders as in need of special protections. 
 15.  Id.
 16.  Id. at 883 (“For decades, the law has struggled with the plight of the close 
corporation minority shareholder.”); see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 371 (articulating 
the view that the debate involves allocating the role of contracting and judicial resolution 
of disputes).  
 17.  See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 
1975) (articulating and applying a heightened fiduciary duty for close corporation 
shareholders).   
 18.  See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 553 (N.C. 1983) (interpreting a 
North Carolina statutory provision providing for dissolution or other “appropriate” 
remedies).   
 19.  See Moll, supra note 7, at 884 nn.5–6, 892 n.33; Thompson, supra note 6, at 
386–88. 
 20.  See Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 557–60 (evaluating the argument that close 
corporation non-controlling shareholders could bargain for protections prior to entering 
the arrangement); see also Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486–87 (D.C. Cir. 1957); 
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (“No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the 
disadvantaged minority.”). 
 21.  See, e.g., Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563 (discussing “reasonable expectations” 
as discernible from the “course of dealing” of the parties). 
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Equity crowdfunding applies a new tension to the already uneasy 
division between public and close corporations.22 Equity crowdfunding 
likely will be utilized in startups23 and small- to medium-sized business 
entities.24 For the most part, startups utilizing crowdfunding will do so 
for a specific purpose—perhaps to close a gap in funding early in their 
life cycle or to avoid selling substantial equity to other types of 
investors.25 Given the nature of the startup life cycle, these corporations 
generally expand beyond the typical bounds of the close corporation as 
they use early capital to build scale, with a clear expectation that early 
investors will reap gains when the corporation is later sold or taken 
public.26 The same will not be true of many permanently small 
businesses that may also utilize crowdfunding.27 Such entities typically 
are not prime candidates for traditional equity investments, even if they 
stand to achieve and maintain long-term and stable profitability.28
For that reason, this article focuses on intracorporate lawsuits in 
equity-crowdfunded entities that mirror those arising in closer and non-
public enterprises. Close, non-public enterprises usually have a relatively 
smaller number of founding players, many of which serve as officers and 
directors in addition to maintaining their ownership interests. By 
contrast, most crowd shareholders who invest in such ventures are likely 
to be mere shareholders. The result is the “close-but-crowdfunded”
entity: an enterprise expected to remain close between and among the 
founding shareholder-officer-directors and illiquid as to every 
shareholder, while looking much larger and more public because it has 
invited a crowd of additional shareholders from the Internet into the 
 22.  As discussed later, there are now many large and private corporations that also 
do not fit neatly into the definition of a public or close corporation. See infra Section 
III.E.
 23.  See generally Seth Oranburg, Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for 
Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397 (2015) [hereinafter 
Oranburg, Bridgefunding]. 
 24.  See Richard Swart, Why Equity Crowdfunding Matters to Small Business,
ENTREPRENEUR (July 21, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/278744. Larger 
corporations desiring access to capital from a large number of investors should be 
expected to continue conducting traditional public securities offerings.  
 25.  See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 419; see also Darian Ibrahim, 
Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 580–81 (2015) 
(describing misfit between professional investment and the lower cash needs of certain 
types of startups).  
 26.  See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 405. 
 27.  See id. (describing smaller businesses as distinguished from fast-growing 
startups). 
 28.  Id.
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corporate fold.29 The tensions created by close-but-crowdfunded entities 
raise important questions in light of the ongoing debate about 
intracorporate disputes in close corporations. How should this close-but-
crowdfunded entity, as a whole, be defined once the crowd invests? Does 
it remain a close corporation, or is it now a public corporation? If it is a 
public corporation, should the close corporation doctrine merely vanish? 
In light of this new tension, courts and legislatures may again find 
themselves grappling with how to resolve disputes between founding 
shareholder-officer-directors in crowdfunded corporations or lawsuits 
brought by crowd shareholders against non-crowd shareholder-officer-
directors on both old and new theories of oppression.30
This article argues that courts should resolve intracorporate disputes 
in crowdfunded ventures in a manner closer to those occurring in public 
corporations.31 Delaware courts have long rejected oppression doctrine in 
favor of a contractual approach.32 Specifically, Delaware courts refuse to 
provide special protections to non-controlling close corporation 
shareholders, instead taking the position that corporate founders should 
bargain over protections and formalize the specific terms of their 
relationship to each other and the corporation at the outset, no matter 
how small or large their business ultimately becomes.33 While some 
majority-minority inequities that arise in traditional close corporations 
will undoubtedly manifest themselves in close-but-crowdfunded entities, 
these tensions are insufficient to support judicial intervention of the kind 
applied in close corporation cases. Courts therefore should be reluctant to 
impose heightened fiduciary duties, buyouts, or dissolutions on majority 
shareholders in close-but-crowdfunded entities, primarily because the 
reasonable expectations analysis is not justified in light of the disparate 
expectations that can exist in close-but-crowdfunded corporations. 
Equity crowdfunding’s arrival on the scene compels the more heavily 
contractual analysis applied in Delaware over the judicial supervision 
contemplated in close corporation cases. 
This article’s analysis depends upon a few assumptions and caveats 
about the widespread adoption and trajectory of equity crowdfunding and 
the status of oppression doctrines in numerous states. First, the article 
 29.  Cf. Heminway, supra note 1, at 479–80 (describing the manner in which 
crowdfunding blurs the longstanding distinction in securities regulation between public 
and private securities).   
 30.  See infra Section IV.C (illustrating potential oppression-like claims that could 
arise in close-but-crowdfunded ventures).   
 31.  See infra Sections IV.C–.D. 
 32.  See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (holding that 
Delaware law does not provide special remedies for non-statutory closely-held 
corporations).   
 33.  Id. at 1379–80. 
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assumes equity crowdfunding will be adopted broadly enough to produce 
lawsuits. Given the thoroughly discussed shortcomings of Regulation 
Crowdfunding, widespread equity crowdfunding activity simply may 
never arrive.34 Even so, early reports suggest equity crowdfunding is 
taking root in some businesses in some places.35 Other reports suggest 
that many small ventures are utilizing state law crowdfunding 
exemptions and forgoing nationwide offerings of securities.36 In addition, 
much of this article focuses on businesses that will likely remain 
relatively small and close, and otherwise would not become large or 
public.37 Finally, this article does not provide significant substantive 
analysis of Delaware law, which, as noted above, has never recognized a 
heightened fiduciary duty, does not have statutory provisions or judicial 
recognition for buyouts or dissolutions,38 and has expressed a clear 
preference for contracting in non-statutory close corporations.39 Despite 
 34.  See generally C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: 
Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway, How 
Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty 
Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865 
(2014). 
 35.  See generally Marc A. Leaf, Robert T. Esposito & Abigail Luhn, Leading the 
Crowd: An Analysis of the First 50 Crowdfunding Offerings, DRINKERBIDDLE (July 14, 
2016), http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/publications/2016/07/leading-the-crowd-
first-50-crowdfunding-offerings.  
 36.  E.g., Jeannette Lee Falsey, Sitka Brewery Is First to Sell Shares Under New 
Alaska Crowdfunding Law, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2017/04/14/sitka-brewery-is-first-to-sell-shares-
under-new-alaska-crowdfunding-law/.   
 37.  Some examples include craft breweries, see id., food trucks, and similar 
business ventures whose strategy includes an appeal to smallness or localness. See
Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 406 (discussing permanently small businesses 
expected to grow sustainably, but not quickly); see also J.W. Verret, Uber-ized 
Corporate Law: Toward a 21st Century Corporate Governance for Crowdfunding and 
App-Based Investor Communications, 41 J. CORP. L. 927, 930–31 (2016) (observing a 
space for crowdfunded small businesses to experiment with new ideas in their 
governance).  
 38.  The Delaware General Corporation Law does provide for the appointment of a 
custodian with the authority to sell or dissolve a corporation upon the finding of a 
deadlock between directors and related circumstances. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 
(2017). Deadlock, however, is not the same as oppression in the vast majority of cases. 
See generally F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 7.16 (rev. 2d ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION] (describing how various state statutes 
define deadlocks that would give rise to judicial remedies).  
 39.  See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–80 (Del. 1993) (discussing 
the opportunity for shareholders in close corporations to contract for various protections 
ex ante). The Delaware approach to close corporations likely mirrors the one proposed 
for close-but-crowdfunded corporations advanced in this article. Nonetheless, Delaware 
has recognized the existence of an equitable dissolution remedy for LLC membership 
assignees in the context of the deadlocked LLC, which, importantly, derived not from the 
statute—which provided for dissolution only upon petition of a member—but from the 
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Delaware’s significance in the development of corporation law, early 
evidence suggests crowdfunding is occurring in a substantial number of 
corporations formed outside of Delaware.40 In these places, and in the 
business sectors where equity crowdfunding may be expected to take 
root, close-but-crowdfunded corporations are poised to become a 
substantial slice of the crowdfunding market. It is in these jurisdictions 
that this article’s proposal to follow Delaware’s contract-focused 
approach will be most important. 
The current scholarly focus on crowdfunding involves the merits 
and demerits of Title III of the JOBS Act and its resultant Regulation 
Crowdfunding,41 proposals for the continued development of 
crowdfunding,42 and the critical work of constructing the phenomenon’s
theoretical architecture—especially in the investment crowdfunding 
context.43 Less material exists covering corporate governance issues that 
may emerge in crowdfunded ventures.44 This article supplies the first 
exploration of equity crowdfunding in the context of the close 
corporation. 
Part II of this article provides a brief history of crowdfunding, 
distinguishes equity crowdfunding from other forms of crowdfunding, 
discusses the forms equity investment may take in investment 
crowdfunding, briefly evaluates potential limitations to equity 
crowdfunding under current law, and discusses the broader social and 
economic context from which crowdfunding emerged.45 Part III contains 
a review of the divide between judicial treatment of public corporations 
and close corporations, and illustrates how crowdfunding applies tension 
to this divide.46 Part IV defends the claim that crowdfunding will emerge 
in previously close corporations and argues that courts should not 
apply—and crowd shareholders should not expect courts to apply—close 
constitutional power of the Delaware courts. See In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 
592, 601–02 (Del. Ch. 2015). Some crowdfunded equity may be sold as membership 
units in LLCs. See Leaf et al., supra note 35 (stating that 6 of the first 50 filings under 
this new regulation include a sale of LLC membership interests).  
 40.  See Leaf et al., supra note 35 (showing that 24 of the first 50 offerings under 
this new regulation were in Delaware). See generally Anthony Zeoli, Intrastate 
Crowdfunding: The Often Overlooked Option, CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 25, 2016, 
12:23 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/05/86096-intrastate-crowdfunding-
the-often-overlooked-option/. 
 41.  See generally Bradford, supra note 34; Heminway, supra note 34. 
 42.  E.g., Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 419–22 (introducing a proposal 
for crowdfunding to provide a “bridge” in the financing life cycle for startups). 
 43.  See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1; Heminway, supra note 1, at 477. 
 44.  See generally Verret, supra note 37.   
 45.  See infra Part II. 
 46.  See infra Part III. 
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corporation doctrines in close-but-crowdfunded corporations.47 A brief 
conclusion follows. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding lies at the convergence of technological innovations 
in networked communication and the age-old concept of raising money 
by soliciting small contributions from a large number of people.48 The 
Internet revolutionized social networks and obliterated communication 
barriers, while payment systems evolved to permit quick and easy digital 
transfers of funds. This dramatic change culminated in inexpensive 
platforms where people could collect money easily and efficiently.49
Cataloguing the permutations of crowdfunding is beyond the scope of 
this article, but this Part provides an illustrative sample. 
A. Crowdfunding By Definition 
Crowdfunding connects excitement for an idea, product, or service 
with previously untapped funds. In addition to the efficiencies in 
communication and payment systems discussed above, crowdfunding is 
identifiable by the outpouring of funds from communities of common 
interest.50 For example, one of the first instances of modern, Internet-
based crowdfunding was an informal 1997 fundraising drive by fans of 
the English progressive rock band Marillion.51 When the band’s record 
 47.  See infra Part IV. 
 48.  See Bradford, supra note 43, at 11 n.17 (comparing crowdfunding to the 
donative model used to fund political campaigns). Another historical example is famed 
newspaper publisher Joseph Pulitzer’s fundraising drive to purchase and construct the 
pedestal for the Statue of Liberty. See The Statue of Liberty and America’s Crowdfunding 
Pioneer, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21932675. 
The statue, a gift from the people of France, faced a funding crisis as funding bills in the 
State of New York and Congress failed. Id. Pulitzer stepped in, publishing his plea for 
funds in his New York World newspaper with the promise that every donor’s name would 
be printed. Id. The campaign raised just over the $100,000 needed to complete the 
project. Id.
 49.  See Bradford, supra note 43, at 10 n.11 (“[A]n entrepreneur can ‘in real time 
and with no incremental cost . . . [sell] . . . to literally millions of potential investors.’”) 
(quoting Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing 
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 6 
(2007)). 
 50.  See Mathieu-Claude Chaboud, How Do the Crowdfunders Judge the 
Crowdfunded? Crowdfunding, Social Capital, and the Gatekeepers of the Financial 
Legitimacy, in STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO SUCCESSFUL CROWDFUNDING 78, 79 
(Djamchid Assadi ed., 2016) (discussing generally the idea of support for a particular 
product from a community of interest). 
 51.  See Dean Golemis, British Band’s U.S. Tour Is Computer-Generated, CHI. TRIB.
(Sept. 23, 1997), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-09-23/features/9709230071_ 
1_music-fans-newsgroup-marillion. 
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label faced financial trouble, Marillion announced to United States-based 
fans that it would be unable to make its scheduled summer tour in the 
United States.52 Disappointed fans connected with one another through 
message boards and email and began raising money to bring Marillion to 
the United States.53 The cavalcade of donations quickly reached $25,000, 
allowing Marillion to schedule the tour.54 The campaign ultimately raised 
$47,000, with money left over to fund the production of 1,000 special 
edition live recordings of the tour, which were distributed to donors.55
Marillion’s story illustrates the affinity-based ethos of 
crowdfunding. Since Marillion’s 1997 United States tour, numerous 
other musicians, artists, writers, and other creative producers have turned 
to crowdfunding to collect money for their projects.56 Such projects now 
are often described as “donation,” “rewards-based,” or “pre-order”
crowdfunding, based on what the crowdfunders receive in return for their 
funds, such as a discounted copy of the eventual product, other 
promotional items, or various tokens of gratitude.57 For many 
crowdfunders, providing money for these projects is an exercise in 
patronage—that is, the donation is made out of affinity for the artist, art, 
or product, rather than a desire for the reward itself. 
Donation, rewards-based, and pre-order crowdfunding are not 
limited to creative ventures. Producers of many varieties launch 
crowdfunding campaigns as a part of pre-marketing or even pre-
producing their products, or to market-test a new line.58 Further, there are 
several non-equity crowdfunding platforms devoted to general-purpose 
entrepreneurship and business ideas across a multitude of industries.59
The other major form of donation or rewards-based crowdfunding is 
the charitable micro-lending form best exemplified by Kiva.60 Founded 
 52.  See id.
 53.  See id.
 54.  See id.
 55.  See id.
 56.  See Bradford, supra note 43, at 12 nn.22–23, 13 n.29. 
 57.  See Seth C. Oranburg, The Non-Pecuniary Value of Equity Crowdfunding 3
(Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 2015-10, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620011.   
 58.  See Ryan Underwood, 3 Smart Ways to Use Data When Developing Products,
INC., Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014, https://www.inc.com/magazine/201312/ryan-underwood/ 
how-to-put-data-in-product-development.html (describing the use of crowdfunding as a 
“proof-of-concept tool”). 
 59.  For example, Peerbackers bills itself as “the first crowdfunding platform for 
entrepreneurs.” See About the Team, PEERBACKERS, http://peerbackers.com/about.html 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see also Bradford, supra note 43, at 12 nn.23–27 (listing 
crowdfunding sites for various industries).
 60.  See The Journey of a Kiva Loan, KIVA, https://www.kiva.org/about/how (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2017). Closely related—perhaps as a precursor to charitable micro-
lending—are micro-finance organizations that loan money to the poor, but collect interest 
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in 2005, Kiva is a platform where crowdfunders provide small amounts 
of money to be loaned to micro-entrepreneurs in the developing world.61
The loans carry no interest but are to be repaid.62 According to the site, 
most Kiva donors simply roll their “returns” into other loans.63 Kiva’s
version of crowdfunding is charitable in nature—again, no Kiva 
crowdfunder expects investment-style returns in exchange for providing 
capital.64
B. Hurtling Toward Investment Crowdfunding: Debt and Equity 
Given the success stories of donation, rewards-based, and pre-order 
crowdfunding, there inevitably emerged a desire, by entrepreneurs and 
potential crowd investors alike, for a way to utilize crowdfunding 
platforms for financial investments. Not only were the non-investment 
crowdfunding platforms a new way to raise money, they also opened up 
a new class of potential investors.65
Small businesses or fast-growing startups66 almost invariably find 
themselves in need of substantial seed, growth, and operating capital. 
Traditional sources of capital begin with friends and family,67 or a 
dedicated group of other, more established business people—known as 
“angel” investors—who provide capital along with mentorship, 
management expertise, or other resources.68 These resources are limited; 
venturers only have so many friends, may not have family members with 
substantial resources, may not be able to persuade bankers of the 
viability of their product or service, and may not have the personal and 
geographic connections that usually lead to a pitch meeting with angel 
investors or other venture capitalists.69 Likewise, venture capitalists 
and retain earnings much like banks. See Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and Financial 
Development, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 271, 278–79 (2004).   
 61.  See The Journey of a Kiva Loan, supra note 60. 
 62.  Id.
 63.  Id.
 64.  Id. (stating that Kiva borrowers pay no interest to lenders or Kiva). 
 65.  See generally Andrew Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV.
609, 615 (2015) (stating that moving from non-investment to investment crowdfunding 
takes the model “one step further”).
 66.  Discussion of investment crowdfunding often appears in the context of fast-
growing startups, which burn through capital quickly before eventually maturing into a 
larger enterprise or being acquired by one. See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, 
at 405. Nonetheless, crowdfunding may be viable in “permanently” small businesses. See 
Schwartz, supra note 65, at 624 (describing crowdfunding as a source of financing for 
businesses outside the traditional Silicon Valley startup model).   
 67.  And “fools,” as they are sometimes called.
 68.  See Seth C. Oranburg, A Place of Their Own: Crowds in the New Market for 
Equity Crowdfunding, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 147, 150 (2016).   
 69.  See id. at 150 (discussing the personal networks of professional investors in 
Silicon Valley); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed 
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primarily invest in fast-growing startups only after some proof of 
viability, in hopes of landing huge returns on scalable ventures.70 For a 
small, local, or community-based business, the relevant scale is less steep 
and the possibility of a grand future payday may be remote, even if long-
term profitability is achievable. 
On the investor side, many people participate in some form of 
investing, even if only through a retirement account or placing savings 
within various “retail” investment funds such as mutual funds. Many 
more people participate in social networking, with networks or sub-
networks coalescing around common interests. Contributing to a 
Kickstarter71 in return for a first-run version of the product, or even a t-
shirt, represents a tangible connection to the relevant community of 
common interest.72 Another notable example is that of the fans of the 
National Football League’s Green Bay Packers, who have on multiple 
occasions rushed to purchase “shares” of the football team, despite the 
fact that such shares never pay dividends, cannot be resold, and 
otherwise have no tangible market value.73 The football team has used 
funds raised from the sale of these largely valueless shares to fund the 
continued residence of the team in Green Bay, Wisconsin, and several 
capital-intensive improvements to their facilities.74 How different, then, 
is a “real,” even if small, investment in a business or idea? At least in 
theory, crowdfunding connects small businesses or startups in need of 
capital with a new class of investors, brought together by common 
interest, the networking power of the Internet, and perhaps a non-
financial affinity for the people, products, or services at the heart of the 
business. 
There is only one small hurdle: selling equity to a large group of 
investors quite clearly is an offering of securities subject to the Securities 
at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 931–
32 (2011). 
 70.  See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 410–11.  
 71.  Kickstarter is among the more well known crowdfunding platforms. Essentially, 
any person can post a “project” and seek donations from the crowd. See generally About 
Us, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/about?ref=nav (last visited Oct. 10, 
2017). The site began as an alternative funding source for creative projects, but many 
entrepreneurs have used it to test more traditional business ideas. Id.; see also
Technology, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/discover/categories/technology? 
ref=footer (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).   
 72.  See Chaboud, supra note 50, at 79 (discussing the manner in which donation 
crowdfunding endeavors to tap into particular communities of interest). See generally 
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 69 (discussing crowdfunders as consumer-investors 
whose investments may derive from a passion for the product or service).  
 73.  See GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., COMMON STOCK OFFERING DOCUMENT 4 (2011), 
http://shareholder.broadridge.com/pdf/gbp/gbp_2011_offering_document.pdf. 
 74.  See id. at ii (describing 2003 and 2011 offerings as being conducted for stadium 
improvements). 
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Act of 193375 (the “1933 Act”),76 not to mention state securities laws.77
Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act defines “security” broadly to include 
essentially any sale of an investment opportunity.78 In SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co.,79 the United States Supreme Court adopted a similarly broad 
definition of “investment contract” under Section 2(a)(1), finding within 
the reach of the 1933 Act any “contract, transaction or scheme whereby a 
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”80 The 
breadth of the 1933 Act established the essential framework for securities 
law: all public offerings of securities must be registered in accordance 
with the 1933 Act and relevant implementing regulations, unless some 
exemption applies.81
Because crowdfunded sales of debt or equity in a venture are 
subject to the 1933 Act, Congress enacted the JOBS Act, which included 
the CROWDFUND Act.82 The latter instructed the SEC to implement an 
exemption for crowdfunding.83 The SEC finalized “Regulation 
Crowdfund,” or “Regulation CF,” on October 30, 2015, and the rules 
became effective on May 16, 2016.84 Reception of the CROWDFUND 
Act and its implementing regulations has been lukewarm, at best.85 The 
specific provisions are beyond the scope of this article, but suffice to say, 
the Act and regulations—at a minimum—create a legal avenue for 
experimenting with crowdfunding. 
As with most investments, crowdfunding can take the form of debt 
or equity. Peer-to-peer lending networks, such as Lending Club, are a 
 75.  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. 
 76.  For a thorough and conclusive analysis on this matter, see Heminway & 
Hoffman, supra note 69, at 882–906.  
 77.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 73-101(b), -103(a)(20) (2017) (definition of 
“security”).  
 78.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
 79.  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
 80.  Id. at 298–99.   
 81.  See Heminway, supra note 1, at 481. 
 82.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301, 126 Stat. 306, 
314–15 (2012).   
 83.  See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,389 (Nov. 15, 2015) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239–40, 249, 269, 274) (describing Title III of the JOBS 
Act and the SEC’s role in implementing the legislation and citing its statutory authority); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(6) (authorizing the SEC to exempt transactions as set forth in 
the JOBS Act).   
 84.  See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,537, 71,611.   
 85.  Most commentators have been critical of the exemption, suggesting it is too 
costly and too slow to achieve its stated purpose of connecting potential crowd investors 
with small businesses and startups who could benefit from crowdfunding. See, e.g.,
Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 418 (citing figures suggesting that a round of 
$100,000 of investment could cost as much as $39,000); see also supra note 34 and 
accompanying text.  
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form of debt crowdfunding.86 The basic premise is that an individual or 
small business applies for a loan amount, Lending Club computes the 
credit risk factors, and then loan investors choose whether or not to fund 
them.87 Similarly, many current crowdfunding portals include offerings 
of short- or long-term notes.88 Debt crowdfunding, however, is not the 
focus of this article—offering notes and seeking loans from investors do 
not implicate the internal workings of a corporation.89 This article 
focuses on equity crowdfunding, where the utilization of crowdfunding 
results in new shareholders being welcomed to the venture. 
III. A SORT OF DIVIDE: INTRACORPORATE DISPUTES LARGE AND 
SMALL
Public corporations and close corporations, and the disputes that 
arise within each, are different because of the differences in formal 
separation of the roles of shareholder, officer, and director, the exercise 
of corporate decision-making power, and the market for resale of shares. 
Courts and legislatures have devised special protections for close 
corporation non-controlling shareholders to mitigate the effects of losing 
their roles and financial interests through otherwise permissible business 
decisions such as termination from employment and removal from 
companies’ boards. These protections are special—they expand the 
rights of a non-controlling shareholder beyond the formal rights 
contained within most general corporation statutes. Courts usually rely 
on two justifications for providing these special protections. First, close 
corporation shareholders usually trust each other more than typical co-
venturers because of preexisting family or social relationships. Because 
of their lack of resources and this implicit trust, they do not develop and 
negotiate minority protections or contingencies for disputes or engage 
counsel to do so for them. Because of this observed lack of contracting, 
courts have concluded that requiring such contracting can be 
impracticable and unfair. Second, and similarly, the lack of contracting 
and the more discernible course of dealing among close corporation 
shareholders permit courts to draw relatively strong inferences about the 
reasonable expectations of minority shareholders with respect to their 
roles and financial interests in the venture. 
 86.  See generally LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6–7 (Feb. 28, 
2017) (describing how borrowers apply for loans and investors invest in loans). 
 87.  See id. at 9–10. 
 88.  See, e.g., Brewtex, LLC, Offering Statement (Form C) (Apr. 28, 2017) (offering 
promissory notes in increments of one dollar to fund development of a craft beer-themed 
event complex). 
 89.  See Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 563 (“From a legal perspective, equity 
crowdfunding is the far more interesting of the two types . . . .”).
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A. The Public Corporation as the Paradigm of the Corporate Form 
Corporations, axiomatically, are creatures of numerous state 
statutes, each of which sets forth the package of formal features of the 
arrangement known as the “corporation.”90 Since the advent of general 
incorporation statutes—as opposed to the requirement of a legislative 
charter—state corporation law has applied rigidly to all corporations, 
regardless of size, value, or number of shareholders.91 Most corporation 
statutes establish the following general attributes: “formal creation as 
prescribed by state law; legal personality; separation of ownership and 
control; freely alienable ownership interests; indefinite duration; and 
limited liability.”92 Resting atop these identifying features of the 
corporation is the equally important package of rights, responsibilities, 
and duties that exist among the corporate players themselves: the 
shareholders, officers, and directors.93
Generally, shareholders invest capital in return for the right to the 
residual value of the corporation, and exercise their voice in corporate 
affairs by voting on the election of directors.94 Shareholders also may 
freely sell their shares.95 Directors, as a board, possess all corporate 
decision-making power, which is exercised through majority vote of the 
board.96 Officers manage the corporate assets and act on behalf of the 
corporation under the supervision of the board of directors.97 As a 
default, the shareholder vote on the election of directors and the director 
vote on matters of corporate policy require only a simple majority—
minority shareholders can lose a vote on the election of directors, and 
directors can lose a vote on matters of corporate policy.98
At the significant economic inflection point of the Great 
Depression, federal regulation of the sale of securities imparted a drastic 
change to corporation law.99 The 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934100 (the “1934 Act”) imposed significant regulatory 
obligations on corporations with substantial numbers of outstanding 
 90.  E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1 (2017).  
 91.  See Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the 
United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 664 (1989).   
 92.  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 2 (2d ed. 2009).   
 93.  See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141–174; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT chs. 
7–8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 94.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28.   
 95.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 6.   
 96.  E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b).   
 97.  E.g., id. § 142.   
 98.  E.g., id. § 216(2). 
 99.  See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 344 (2013). 
 100.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881.   
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shares of stock and those who wished to become such corporations.101
That is, corporations that arguably were relatively larger—in number of 
shareholders, asset value, and other indicators—became subject to the 
newly-extended reach of federal regulatory jurisdiction. 
As federal securities regulation pressured corporations seeking 
wider sources of capital to engage in cost-increasing reporting and 
disclosure activities, state law liberalized in ways that were often more 
beneficial or efficient in the context of the large, public corporation.102
Larger and more sophisticated corporations with the resources to engage 
expensive counsel could assemble the appropriate set of statutory 
features while efficiently navigating formalities and regulatory 
requirements. In a sense, this reflected a fair trade for the economically 
valuable features of the corporate form. Those wishing to avail 
themselves of limited liability, legal personality, and the other desirable 
features of the corporate form could bear the costs of navigating 
formalities and regulatory requirements. Furthermore, small groups 
intent upon carrying on a profitable enterprise could utilize the tried-and-
true partnership form, with its heightened partner-to-partner fiduciary 
obligations, less rigorous formal requirements, and dissolution-at-will.103
Given the historical development of the law regarding public 
corporations, the principles espoused in most states’ general corporation 
laws fit best in the public corporation context.104
B. Close Corporations and the Blurring of the Roles 
Limited liability and perpetual existence are desirable features for 
anyone seeking to operate a business, not just those looking to 
accumulate and deploy relatively large amounts of capital.105 Some 
“small” businesses may achieve relative largeness by asset value without 
the capital accumulating power of public equity markets.106 The 
 101.  See id.
 102.  See Karjala, supra note 91, at 666. Further, Delaware became the most 
prominent state for incorporation, ostensibly because its corporation law is “enabling” or 
“liberal” relative to other states. See Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” 
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW.
U. L. REV. 913, 913 (1982).   
 103.  See Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 545–48 (Tex. 1998) 
(discussing fiduciary duties and the at-will nature of the partnership relationship). 
 104.  Some commentators suggest these principles only fit large, public corporations. 
See ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & FRANCES S. FENDLER, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 341 (2d ed. 2012) (“The requirements for formal board action often 
make little sense . . . [w]hen all of the shareholders are directors and participate in the 
management of the business . . . .”).  
 105.  See Karjala, supra note 91, at 677. 
 106.  For example, Cargill, Inc., one of the world’s largest private corporations, was 
valued at approximately $55 billion based upon figures made public during a 2011 
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business’s smaller number of private shareholders or early market 
success may deliver substantial capital, or the peculiarities of its product 
or service may counsel against seeking public investment.107 This kind of 
relative largeness makes limited liability valuable and the unlimited 
liability of the partnership form undesirable.108 Despite potential misfit, 
smaller businesses with no intention of becoming large or public adopted 
the corporate form to achieve limited liability.109 As a result, these firms 
also accepted the permanence, majority-rules power structure, and rigid 
formal roles of shareholders, officers, and directors.110 Despite using the 
same package of features, the expectations, motivations, and incentives 
of the primary players in close corporations are very different than those 
of the primary players in the typical public corporation.111
Investors in public corporations are almost exclusively “mere”
shareholders.112 Their investment decisions revolve around financial 
returns, and they lack significant personal interest in the operation or 
management of the corporation, unless particularly bad management 
conduct harms the investors’ financial interests.113 Furthermore, vesting 
corporate power and discretion with a smaller group of directors is 
considered a competitive advantage of the corporate form.114 Public 
spinoff. See Lisa Lee, Cargill Valuation Validates Wall St Rules of Thumb, REUTERS
(Jan. 20, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2011/01/20/cargill-valuation-
validates-wall-st-rules-of-thumb/.  
 107.  See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 406 (describing the limited 
utility of equity investment in very small businesses).   
 108.  Modern hybrid entities, such as limited liability companies, provide the 
protection of limited liability but with more flexible governance features than general 
corporation law. See Wayne M. Gazur, The Limited Liability Company Experiment: 
Unlimited Flexibility, Uncertain Role, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 139 (describing 
flexibility as part of the “original mission” of the limited liability company).  
 109.  See Karjala, supra note 91, at 677. 
 110.  Id.
 111.  Id. at 888–89.  
 112.  Id.
 113.  Some commentators have argued that the view of the dispersed, passive 
shareholder is no longer an accurate representation of the reality of the public 
corporation. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffery N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 864 (2013) (describing the paradigm of the 
dispersed class of shareholders as “obsolete” in light of substantial institutional investor 
ownership of shares); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A 
Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate 
Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1871–72 (2017) (proposing a paradigm shift in 
the view of the individual public shareholder from an activism perspective). But see 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1735, 1752 (2006) (arguing that the costs of corporate governance activism in 
most cases generally will not exceed the benefits that might be expected to derive from 
that activism).   
 114.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 555–56 (2003). 
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corporation shareholders’ ability to sell their shares in a liquid market 
provides recourse for poor performance or disagreement with director or 
manager decision-making—a consideration known as “exit.”115 Exit, in 
turn, increases efficiency by providing a measure of market discipline.116
On the other hand, shareholders in close corporations often are not 
mere shareholders. These shareholders often serve as officers who have 
invested not only capital, but also substantial opportunity costs in their 
ventures.117 Rounding out their roles, they also serve as directors, taking 
an active role in fundamental business decisions.118 Thus, many actors in 
close corporations are best identified as “shareholder-officer-directors,”
assuming and performing all roles in the life of the business at various 
times. Because the relatively small number of shareholder-officer-
directors makes communication and coordination of decision-making 
easy, the parties often—or at least occasionally—forgo required 
formalities such as board meetings and recorded votes.119 Shareholder-
officer-directors in close corporations also expect that their personal 
financial success will flow from direct participation in the business as an 
officer and director with a salary and benefits.120 Consequently, most 
shareholder-officer-directors do not expect that their equity ownership in 
the company will be the primary source of the financial return on their 
investment.121 This “intimate, illiquid”122 arrangement is suitable, unless 
conflict emerges between the shareholder-officer-directors. 
When a conflict between the majority and minority emerges, the 
rigid and formal majority-rules power structure becomes of renewed 
importance. Using the formal authority of the corporation—authority that 
perhaps has not been exercised since the inception of the business—a
controlling shareholder-officer-director can not only outvote a minority 
shareholder-officer-director on the substantive issue leading to the 
 115.  See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of 
Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1217 
(2009).   
 116.  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency 
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 291–93 (1986) (proposing that managers of public 
corporations who make errors should be subject to market discipline).  
 117.  See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (addressing 
a case where a minority shareholder invested substantial assets and worked for a close 
corporation, giving rise to expectation of participation in the business’s financial 
success). 
 118.  See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659–60 
(Mass. 1976) (discussing a corporation where all shareholders also served as officers and 
directors).   
 119.  See Karjala, supra note 91, at 698–99.   
 120.  See Ragazzo, supra note 8, at 1107–11.   
 121.  See Thompson, supra note 6, at 372–73 (discussing the loss in value of an 
investment when employment is terminated).   
 122.  Id. at 3.  
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disagreement, but can also unceremoniously remove him or her from the 
board and terminate the minority shareholder from his or her officer 
position.123 The result of these actions is to silence the minority 
shareholder’s voice in corporate affairs. Yet again, illiquidity of close 
corporation stock, as well as other restrictions on transfers, makes exiting 
the close corporation untenable for the newly silent minority 
shareholder.124 No longer earning the salary and benefits that once 
represented his or her financial return for participation in the venture, the 
minority shareholder typically is offered a fire-sale amount for his or her 
equity stake, thus completing what sometimes is described as a 
“freezeout,” “squeezeout,” or more generally, “oppression.”125
Rigid formal organization works efficiently enough for large 
corporations that operate with no confusion about the roles and 
responsibilities of individuals within the corporation. There is no 
confusion about Mark Zuckerberg’s roles as an officer, director, and 
public shareholder of Facebook. To illustrate the contrast to the close 
corporation, consider a small corporation consisting of three shareholder-
officer-directors: A, B, and C. In this hypothetical firm, the formal 
divisions and allocation of power become somewhat of a second thought. 
A, B, and C decide to start an artisanal hamburger restaurant, “The 
Burger Joint,” and form a corporation under the general corporation law 
of their state. Each owns an equal equity stake in the corporation, 
maintains one of three seats on the board of directors, and participates 
fully in the day-to-day operations of the business as an officer. Perhaps 
for perfectly rational reasons, they decide not to clutter their by-laws or 
stockholder agreement with buyout procedures or alter the default, 
majority-rules decision process. Bound by pre-existing social 
relationships, the three defy the odds and steer the fledgling restaurant to 
initial success, while acting harmoniously as shareholder-officer-
directors. They split the profits evenly by paying themselves monthly 
salaries,126 which grow larger as the business thrives. In fact, it is likely 
A, B, and C rarely consider what roles they are playing in the day-to-day 
operation of the business, perfectly content with growing profits and 
wealth. 
After the initial meeting, the three do not call annual shareholder 
meetings or have board meetings—after all, the business is successful 
and everyone is on the same page with respect to all major corporate 
 123.  See Moll, supra note 7, at 890–91. 
 124.  See Means, supra note 115, at 1217.   
 125.  See Moll, supra note 7, at 889–91 (describing the sequence of a typical 
freezeout).  
 126.  The venturers likely chose this method over the payment of dividends on their 
shares to avoid income tax at the corporate level and at the individual level.   
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decisions. A few years later, however, a small disagreement emerges 
between A, B, and C. A and B wish to franchise the business due to the 
potential to further increase earnings and expand the restaurant’s
geographic footprint, despite the increased cost and managerial 
complexity that comes along with franchising. C disagrees, preferring the 
status quo and not wishing to assume the additional cost and complexity 
of running a franchised chain of burger joints. A and B realize that they 
outnumber C, and call the first board meeting in years to vote on whether 
to franchise the burger joint. As fait accompli would have it, A and B
vote for the franchise plan and C casts her hopeless vote against it. As 
the franchising operations begin, C begrudgingly continues working with 
her fellow shareholder-officer-directors. Nonetheless, she cannot help 
but continue to voice her displeasure to A and B, who grow tired of the 
disagreement. The relationship between the once-unanimous group 
sours, leading A and B to conclude that it is beyond repair. At the next 
meeting of the shareholders, A and B decline to vote C to another term as 
a director. At the subsequent board meeting, A and B vote to terminate 
C’s employment. They also vote to continue their practice of not paying 
dividends, while voting to increase their own salaries; it is only fair, in 
their view, because they will now have increased workloads as a result of 
C’s termination. 
Over the course of this intracorporate disagreement, C’s position 
diminishes from equal participation in the business through her 
employment and salary to only holding her equity stake. She is now 
merely a shareholder and no longer a shareholder-officer-director. 
Critically, unlike a large, public corporation shareholder, C is unable to 
sell her equity stake in any identifiable market. Furthermore, A and B do 
not wish—and have no incentive—to buy C out. C is now stuck with no 
salary, no dividends, and no role in the corporation of which she still 
owns one-third. 
C. The Judicial and Legislative Response 
C’s story is a familiar one in close corporations. The blurring of the 
roles of the shareholder-officer-directors seems unimportant when the 
parties agree on all relevant matters, but the formalities of the exercise of 
corporate decision-making authority become painfully concrete when 
disagreement occurs. It was this kind of dispute that encouraged 
legislatures and courts in a number of jurisdictions to recognize remedies 
for “oppressed” minority shareholders of close corporations. These 
remedies include judicial recognition of a heightened fiduciary duty 
owed to the minority, enactment of statutory provisions for involuntary 
dissolution of the corporation or a buyout of the minority, and 
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development of a judicial analysis of the minority’s reasonable 
expectations regarding participation in the enterprise as the definition of 
oppression.127
1. Heightened Fiduciary Duties 
While the first known “oppression” cases date to the late nineteenth 
century,128 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided the 
seminal oppression case in 1975. In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of 
New England, Inc.,129 the court concluded that controlling shareholders 
in close corporations owe an independent and heightened duty of fairness 
to minority shareholders.130 Generally, there are no duties or obligations 
flowing between and among shareholders qua shareholders under general 
corporate principles as there are between partners in a partnership.131
The dispute in Donahue involved a stock repurchase, which is a 
common maneuver in corporations large and small, but for different 
reasons.132 Harry Rodd, his sons, and a loyal corporate lawyer who was 
 127.  See Thompson, supra note 6, at 386–90. Another development was permitting 
traditionally derivative actions to be brought as direct actions where an individual 
shareholder was oppressed in a manner that also harmed the corporation in a derivative 
sense. Id. at 29; cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661
(Mass. 1976) (describing a situation where the only harm was the corporation’s refusal to 
employ and compensate the minority shareholder); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of 
New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 510–11 (Mass. 1975) (describing a situation where corporate 
assets were depleted to repurchase the majority shareholder’s shares). 
 128.  See, e.g., Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 53 N.W. 218, 223 (Mich. 1892) 
(Campbell, J., dissenting).  
 129.  Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).  
 130.  Id. at 515–16. 
 131.  See id. The analogy of the close corporation to the partnership animates some of 
the existing authority applying heightened fiduciary duties in the close corporation 
context, where partners do owe fiduciary duties to one another as partners. See 
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 560–61 (N.C. 1983) (describing the 
“partnership analogy” and applying North Carolina’s dissolution provision under its 
general corporation law); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116, at 297–300 (1986) 
(evaluating the “partnership analogy” as the basis for applying heightened duties in close 
corporations); see also O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION, supra note 38, § 7.5. The 
partnership analogy is particularly relevant because traditionally partnerships did not 
exist perpetually and therefore partners could withdraw the value of their interest in the 
partnership as a matter of law. See generally Rev. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 601 cmt. 1, 603 
cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2013) (discussing the 
differences between the Uniform Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act on whether the partnership is dissolved when a partner withdraws). Though the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act does not require dissolution and winding up of the 
partnership when a partner withdraws as its predecessor Uniform Partnership Act did, a 
partner has the power to withdraw from the partnership and the right to receive some 
form of a buyout upon disassociation. See Rev. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT. § 701(a)–(b), 701 cmt.
1.
132.  Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510; see The Repurchase Revolution; Share Buy-Backs,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2014, at 71 (describing share repurchases in large corporations as 
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also a director utilized their voting power on the board of Rodd 
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc. to cause the corporation to 
purchase outstanding stock held by Harry Rodd.133 The Donahues 
requested that their shares be repurchased on the same terms, but the 
request was refused.134 The practical result, then, was that the Rodds 
voted themselves a distribution of corporate assets and denied the 
Donahues such a distribution135—it was economically similar to the 
Rodds voting to declare dividends to be paid only on their own shares.136
The court ultimately justified its departure from general corporate 
principles in part on the theory that close corporations involved a greater 
level of trust and confidence than is found in public corporations.137
The rule from Donahue figured prominently in a later 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case, Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc.138 Wilkes, compared to Donahue, may be more 
exemplary of the “freezeout” genre. Four shareholder-officer-directors 
shared roughly equal parts in the ownership, management, and control of 
a corporation whose primary business was operating a nursing home.139
“Bad blood” brewed between the plaintiff, Wilkes, and another 
shareholder-officer-director, Quinn.140 The non-belligerent parties sided 
financial “sorcery” utilized to merely reshuffle the capital structure of the corporation 
without changing its underlying value); see also Ira Kay, Executive Pay, Share Buybacks, 
and Managerial Short-Termism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/26/executive-pay-share-
buybacks-and-managerial-short-termism/ (presenting research on, inter alia, whether 
managers of large, public corporations effect share buybacks to increase the value of 
stock options to high-level managers).   
 133.  Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510.   
 134.  Id. at 510–11. Notably, in the four or five years prior to the repurchase, the 
majority offered to repurchase the Donahues’ shares, but at prices 5 to 25 percent ($40–
$200 per share) of the ultimate price paid to Rodd ($800 per share). See id. at 511 n.10. 
 135.  Id. at 519–20.   
 136.  Id. at 518–19. The court also acknowledged the Donahues’ inability to exit the 
corporation due to the non-marketability of their shares and that the opportunity to 
recover the full value of their ownership interests in the corporation was completely at the 
discretion of the Rodds. Id. at 519–20; see also Means, supra note 115, at 1217. 
 137.  Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515–17. The court would later observe that “[n]o 
outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority,” id. at 515, 
implying that contractual arrangements might not be sufficient to protect non-controlling 
shareholders.  
 138.  Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).   
 139.  Id. at 659–60. 
 140.  Id. at 660. According to the court, the dispute emerged when Wilkes persuaded 
the two non-belligerents to demand a higher price for the sale to Quinn of a piece of 
property owned by the corporation. Id. Apparently, Quinn expected to purchase the 
property at a below-market price. See Eric J. Gouvin, Fiduciary Duties in the Closely 
Held Firm 35 Years After Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home: Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc.: The Backstory, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 269, 275–80 (2011) 
(suggesting Quinn regularly negotiated and maintained sweetheart deals for himself).  
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with Quinn, voting at board and shareholder meetings to terminate 
Wilkes’s employment and dismiss him from the board of directors.141
With his money locked in and his influence locked out, Wilkes sued the 
remaining shareholder-officer-directors, alleging, inter alia, that they 
breached their fiduciary duties owed to him as a minority shareholder.142
Though the court cautioned against an “untempered application” of the 
Donahue rule—that is, the court clarified that Donahue was not meant to 
foreclose potentially oppressive decisions made for “legitimate business 
purpose[s]”—it ruled in Wilkes’s favor, granting him his lost salary and 
remanding for a measure of his damages.143 Similar to its analysis in 
Donahue, the Wilkes court relied upon the extent to which the closeness 
of the relationships among the parties justified heightened judicial 
scrutiny.144 Further, the court made several important references to 
understandings of the parties that were not set forth explicitly in any 
written form.145
Some form of the rule established in Donahue and Wilkes exists in a 
number of states.146 Nonetheless, Professors Robert B. Thompson and 
Mary Siegel have both noted that the heightened fiduciary duties version 
of oppression is not the most common or popular avenue for providing a 
remedy to an oppressed minority shareholder.147 As Professor Thompson 
observes, the rule from Donahue and Wilkes has stood the test of time 
more as a reflection of the general principles of oppression than for the 
use of heightened fiduciary duties as the mode of establishing grounds 
for relief.148 Today, the more common mode of relief is through statutes 
defining oppression and establishing specific forms of relief.149
 141.  Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660–61.   
 142.  Id. at 659. 
 143.  Id. at 663–65. 
 144.  Id. at 663–64.  
 145.  See id. at 660 (explaining that all the parties “understood” that their ownership 
and management of the firm would be conducted as equal partners).  
 146.  See O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION, supra note 38, §§ 7.4–.5 (collecting 
and analyzing cases applying a heightened or partnership-style fiduciary duty in close 
corporations); Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377, 381–82 (2004); see also Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 906 n.52 (Tex. 
2014) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (citing cases where state courts adopted heightened 
fiduciary duties as a remedy for minority shareholder oppression); Thompson, supra note 
7, at 388–89.  
 147.  Siegel, supra note 146, at 382; Thompson, supra note 6, at 369–70.  
 148.  Thompson, supra note 6, at 371. Notably, the heightened fiduciary duties rule 
for oppression was adopted as a matter of first impression as recently as 2009. See
McLaughlin v. Schenk, 220 P.3d 146, 156 (Utah 2009). Alas, the Utah legislature acted 
quickly to overturn McLaughlin, passing the following unequivocal statutory language: 
“A shareholder of a corporation, when acting solely in the capacity of a shareholder, has 
no fiduciary duty or other similar duty to any other shareholder of the corporation, 
including not having a duty of care, loyalty, or utmost good faith.” UTAH CODE ANN.
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2. Statutory Dissolution and Buyout Remedies 
Because Massachusetts’s corporation law at the time Donahue and 
Wilkes were decided did not contain any particular statutory 
authorization to remedy oppression, the court developed the theory of 
heightened fiduciary duties.150 In addition, no statute provided any 
specific remedy. Thus, the Wilkes court ordered money damages, while 
the Donahue court crafted two primarily equitable solutions.151
Legislative solutions to the plight of the close corporation minority 
shareholder not only established a basis for relief from oppressive acts, 
but also propounded specific remedies. In general terms, these remedies 
involve empowering courts to equitably abrogate the corporation’s
traditionally perpetual existence in some way—such as ordering the 
dissolution of the entity. As a perpetually existing entity, a corporation 
does not cease to exist even if the shareholders find themselves in a 
protracted dispute, and no shareholder may simply “redeem” his or her 
stock for market, fair, or even book value. The most common legislative 
solutions include statutory “equitable” remedies such as dissolution or 
buyout provisions for oppression.152
An exemplary case is Meiselman v. Meiselman.153 The case 
emerged from an internecine dispute between two scions of a burgeoning 
movie theater and commercial real estate empire.154 A common tale in 
close corporations, the story begins with the litigants’ father, H.B. 
Meiselman, who built the empire brick by brick.155 Between 1951 and 
1971, H.B. methodically transferred his interests in the constellation of 
§ 16-10a-622(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2017); see also McLaughlin v. Schenk, 299 P.3d 1139, 
1145 (Utah 2013). 
 149.  O’NEAL & THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION, supra note 38, § 7.11 (noting that 39 states 
have oppression statutes).   
 150.  Massachusetts’s statutes still do not provide for dissolution or any other 
statutory remedy for oppression. See Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 n.7 (Mass. 
2006).  
 151.  Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664–65 (Mass. 
1976) (ordering that plaintiff minority shareholder be paid damages equal to his lost 
salary and benefits); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 
521 (Mass. 1975) (ordering defendant majority shareholder to either (1) return $36,000 
plus interest to the corporation in exchange for the treasury shares he caused the 
corporation to purchase from him or (2) cause the corporation to buy out the minority 
shareholder for $36,000).  
 152.  Ritchie v. Rupe provides an excellent 50-state survey of states that allow 
liquidation for oppressive or similar conduct. Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 894–95
& nn.12–14 (Tex. 2014). As a procedural matter, some states, such as Texas, conduct 
dissolution or buyout through appointment of a receiver to run the corporation while the 
court’s resolution of the dispute is carried out. See id. at 863. 
153. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).   
 154.  Id. at 553–54.  
 155.  Id. at 553. 
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family corporations to his sons, Michael and Ira, who began working in 
the family business in 1956 and 1965, respectively.156 H.B.’s last large 
transfer of his corporate interests in 1971 fell overwhelmingly to Ira, 
leaving Ira in control of all but one of the corporations within the 
empire.157
The Meiselman opinion suggests that the brothers’ personal and 
business relationship soured between 1971 and 1979, as Ira ascended to 
the operation and management of the primary corporation, Eastern 
Federal.158 The controversy ultimately giving rise to the litigation began 
when Michael filed a lawsuit challenging Ira’s sole ownership of a 
management corporation, Republic, which earned income from a 
services contract with Eastern.159 Republic employed Michael and was 
the current iteration of several prior management entities utilized to 
account for management costs shared across the other corporations that 
Michael and Ira had owned jointly.160 Further, Michael’s primary 
participation in the family business, at least from a financial perspective, 
was through his employment with Republic.161 Ira responded to the 
lawsuit by causing the two corporations to cease their management 
contract, and caused Republic to terminate Michael’s employment, 
salary, and benefits.162 The practical effect of the termination of both the 
contract and Michael’s employment was to exclude him completely from 
any role in the day-to-day operation of the business and limit his 
financial participation.163
Michael sued his brother under North Carolina’s general 
corporation law, which, at the time, contained provisions for equitable 
dissolution or other equitable judicial remedies to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders.164 Michael pled two theories. First, he claimed 
 156.  Id. at 553–54.  
 157.  Id. at 553.  
 158.  Id. at 554–55. H.B. passed away in 1978, roughly one year prior to the 
beginning of the litigation. Id. at 556. 
 159.  Id. at 554–55. The crux of Michael’s initial lawsuit was that Ira’s sole 
ownership of Republic entitled him to an unfair share of the income of the overall 
enterprise through Republic’s earnings. Id.
 160.  Id.
 161.  Id. at 555. 
 162.  Id. at 554.  
 163.  Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 555. Ira’s litigation position was that Michael was not 
so excluded, noting that Michael was not banned from company property or denied notice 
of stockholder meetings. Id. The court noted, however, that it was “struck by the tone of 
Ira’s comments” about his brother’s participation in the management and direction of the 
business. Id.
 164.  Id. at 556. At the time, the North Carolina Business Corporation Act 
(N.C.B.C.A.) contained provisions permitting dissolution and a broad menu of other 
equitable oppression remedies such as buyouts and even canceling corporate acts. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1 (1982), replaced by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-14-30 to -31 (2017). 
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that Ira was responsible to the corporation derivatively for incorporating 
a management company owned solely by him and causing Eastern 
Federal to pay the solely owned management company compensation.165
Second, he requested the court use its equitable authority under Section 
55-125.1(a)(4) of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act to 
compel a buyout of his interests in the corporation, claiming that a 
buyout was necessary to protect his rights and interests.166
The court began its analysis by recognizing a distinction between 
“close” corporations and “publicly-held” corporations.167 Describing the 
former as “incorporated partnerships,” the court discussed the potentially 
oppressive circumstances giving rise to a wave of commentary on close 
corporations.168 Notably, the court considered and rejected the argument 
that pre-incorporation contracting presents an adequate opportunity to 
avoid oppression.169 It reasoned that most minority shareholders purchase 
their shares with unequal bargaining power and without even considering 
the possibility of bargaining for minority protections.170
The court set forth the following analytical framework for 
oppression under the North Carolina statute: the court observed that the 
statutory “rights and interests” language represented those rights 
belonging particularly to the complaining shareholder.171 Having defined 
the “rights and interests” as particular to the complaining shareholder, as 
opposed to shareholders generally, the court then confirmed that it would 
follow the analysis of courts that had established the shareholder’s
“reasonable expectations” as the criterion for oppression.172 The court 
presented its reasonable expectations analysis as follows: 
For plaintiff to obtain relief under the expectations’ analysis, he must 
prove that (1) he had one or more substantial reasonable expectations 
known or assumed by the other participants; (2) the expectation has 
In 1990, the broad equitable remedies provision was replaced. See Robert S. McLean, 
Minority Shareholders’ Rights in the Close Corporation Under the New North Carolina 
Business Corporation Act, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1109, 1120–21 (1990). Judicial dissolution is 
the only remaining remedy under the N.C.B.C.A., but the corporation may elect to buy 
out the complaining shareholder if involuntary dissolution is ordered. See id.; see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31(d).   
 165.  Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 556.  
 166.  Id. The requested buyout was the only remedy before the North Carolina 
Supreme Court. Id.
 167.  Id. at 557–61.   
 168.  Id. at 558–59. 
 169.  Id. at 558; cf. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).   
 170.  Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 558 (citing J.A.C. Hetherington, Special 
Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 17–
18).
 171.  Id. at 562. 
 172.  Id. at 563. 
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been frustrated; (3) the frustration was without fault of plaintiff and was 
in large part beyond his control; and (4) under all of the circumstances 
of the case, plaintiff is entitled to some form of equitable relief.173
As the Massachusetts court did in Donahue and Wilkes, the North 
Carolina court fashioned and applied its analysis on the basis that the 
close corporation shareholder possesses rights and interests beyond the 
usual interests of shareholders set forth in general corporation statutes.174
Whether articulated as heightened, shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary 
duty, or applied as a statutory oppression remedy, the crux of the 
oppression doctrine is that it carves out a special rule for close 
corporation majority shareholders from the general corporation law. 
Nonetheless, not every state recognizes a doctrine of minority 
oppression. Delaware, for its enormous influence over corporate law, 
stands in the minority with respect to the oppression doctrine. 
D. Non-Starters: Delaware and Texas 
Delaware has no legislative or judicial exceptions for relatively 
close corporations incorporated under its general corporation law. In 
Nixon v. Blackwell,175 the Delaware Supreme Court had occasion to 
analyze an alleged instance of minority shareholder oppression reflected 
in several majority-beneficial corporate policies that created limited-
purpose opportunities for certain shareholders to receive cash for their 
interests.176 Because the majority enacted and benefitted directly from 
these policies, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied Delaware’s well-
known “entire fairness” analysis.177 In its review, the Delaware Supreme 
Court agreed with the Delaware Court of Chancery that because the 
corporate policies at issue were preferential to the majority, therefore 
 173.  Id. at 564.   
 174.  Id. at 565 (rejecting the argument that Michael had not been denied his 
“traditional shareholder rights” and concluding that “a shareholder’s rights in a closely 
held corporation may not necessarily be so narrowly defined”). 
 175.  Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).   
 176.  Id. at 1370–73. The specific policies included establishment of an Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and the utilization of “key man” life insurance policies. 
Id. at 1371–72. The ESOP provided an opportunity for various employees to accrue 
retirement benefits, choosing upon retirement to take their interest in the ESOP in the 
form of the same Class B stock the minority shareholders owned or cash. Id. at 1371. The 
“key man” program included a provision allowing for the use of the life insurance 
proceeds to repurchase Class B shares from the employee’s estate. Id. at 1371.  
 177.  Blackwell v. Nixon, No. 9041, 1991 WL 194725, at *5 (Del. Chan. Sept. 26, 
1991). The entire fairness test is the standard of review Delaware courts apply to actions 
of corporate boards of directors whose members benefit individually and directly from 
decisions of that board in the course of its direction of the corporation. See Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (1983).   
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making the majority directors interested, entire fairness was the proper 
standard of review.178
Turning to the substance of the allegedly oppressive actions, the 
Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the entire fairness test had been 
met without accepting or rejecting the close corporation analysis of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery.179 Once it concluded the challenged 
policies were fair in substance, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed 
the question of whether it should affirm the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s apparent adoption of Donahue-style minority protections, 
or—to put it in the terms of the Meiselman court—expand the view of 
the expectations of the minority shareholders beyond the “traditional”
shareholder interests.180 Specifically, the Delaware Supreme Court 
analyzed the rationale of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision, 
which it articulated as requiring equality in liquidity, because liquidity is 
an ever-present concern in close corporations.181
“It is not difficult to be sympathetic, in the abstract, to a stockholder 
who finds himself or herself in that position,” the court began, in a 
portion of the opinion titled “No Special Rules for a ‘Closely-Held 
Corporation’ Not Qualified as a ‘Close Corporation’ Under Subchapter 
XIV of the Delaware General Corporation Law.”182 The Delaware 
Supreme Court declined to adopt any form of the Donahue rule for three 
reasons. First, it concluded that “[i]t would do violence to normal 
corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling 
which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buy[]out for which 
the parties had not contracted.”183 That is, parties generally are free to—
and therefore should be expected to—contract for minority shareholder 
protections, liquidity or otherwise.184 Second, Delaware has a separate 
statutory scheme for “close corporations” that counsels against the 
judicial creation of a category of non-statutory closely-held 
corporations.185 Again, the court observed that parties desiring greater 
minority protections in the close corporation context could choose them 
in advance when selecting from the menu of statutory default rules.186
Finally, the court expressed confidence that the entire fairness test, 
“correctly applied and articulated,” provides the proper approach where 
 178.  See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1375. 
 179.  Id. at 1377–78. 
 180.  Id. at 1379–80. 
 181.  Id. at 1376–77. 
 182.  Id. at 1379. 
 183.  Id. at 1380. 
 184.  Id.
185.  See id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (2017)). 
 186.  Id. at 1380–81. 
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it otherwise applies under the general corporation law.187 In sum, the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon reflected the state’s very 
strong preference for contracting as the way to conduct intracorporate 
affairs.188
In 2014, the Texas Supreme Court joined Delaware’s hands-off, 
contractual approach to close corporation shareholder disputes in Ritchie 
v. Rupe.189 Prior to Ritchie, the Texas Supreme Court watched silently as 
intermediate appellate courts fleshed out an oppression doctrine relying 
upon heightened fiduciary duties, Texas’s statutory receivership 
provision, and a definition consistent with the reasonable expectations 
analysis utilized in a number of states.190 A decision of the Houston 
Court of Appeals, Davis v. Sheerin,191 stood as Texas’s primary 
oppression case from when it was decided in 1988 to the time of the 
Ritchie decision.192 In Davis, the 45 percent shareholder of a corporation 
sued the 55 percent shareholders for a panoply of misdeeds, but the 
primary allegation involved the 55 percent shareholders’ insistence that 
the 45 percent shareholder was not actually a shareholder at all.193 The 
court began its analysis by resolving the remedial question of whether a 
buyout was the appropriate remedy for the allegedly oppressive acts 
found by the jury.194 This question was important because Texas’s
oppression statute did not provide specifically for a buyout; it provided 
only for the appointment of a receiver for either rehabilitating the 
 187.  Id. Though the court in Nixon did not rely upon it specifically, commentators 
have observed that corporate federalism provides 50 different sets of default rules from 
which incorporators can choose. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate 
Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 843 (1992) 
(“Firms can . . . not only particularize their charters under a state code, but they can also 
seek to incorporate in the state whose code best matches their needs—i.e., the state whose 
code minimizes their cost of doing business.”); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 6 (1996) (“[S]tates 
compete to offer—and managers to use—beneficial sets of legal rules.”). If parties do not 
prefer Delaware’s strong legislative and judicial commitment to freedom of contract, they 
can choose another state with more robust minority protections. 
 188.  See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1379–80.   
 189.  Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014).   
 190.  See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close Corporations: 
Majority Rule (Still) Isn’t What It Used To Be, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 33, 34 (2008) 
(noting that the Texas Supreme Court had not yet spoken on the matter); see also id. at 
40–46 (discussing Texas precedent on both statutory and fiduciary duty developments).   
 191.  Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. 1988). 
 192.  See Moll, supra note 190, at 34 (describing Davis and the silence of the Texas 
Supreme Court). 
 193.  Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 377–78. The majority shareholder’s claim was that the 
minority shareholder had gifted his interest to the majority some years earlier. Id. There 
also was a supplemental issue regarding a partnership between the majority and minority. 
Id.   
 194.  Id. at 378–80. 
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corporation or dissolving it.195 Nevertheless, the court found it within the 
general equitable powers of Texas courts to fashion an appropriate 
remedy, including a buyout.196 Returning to the substantive question of 
whether the majority had oppressed the minority, the court concluded 
that the majority’s refusal to recognize the minority’s ownership was 
uniquely oppressive in its efforts not only to impair, but also to 
extinguish entirely, the minority’s expectations of ownership and 
participation.197 The court supported its holding with reference to other 
states’ precedent interpreting various statutory oppression remedies.198
The Texas Supreme Court declined review of Davis, thus leaving 
Texas’s trial and intermediate appellate courts to continue grappling with 
close corporation oppression cases. And grapple they did, developing a 
veritable stew of doctrine drawing upon statutory oppression remedies 
and direct majority-minority fiduciary duties of the Donahue variety.199
The Texas Supreme Court delivered a resounding answer in Ritchie,
concluding that neither the Texas rehabilitative receivership statute nor 
common law established the broad oppression doctrine that had been 
developed in the intermediate appellate courts.200 Instead, the court 
narrowed the definition of “oppression” from actions that harm a 
minority shareholder’s reasonable expectations or that depart from a 
general standard of fair dealing to the following conjunctive standard: 
[D]irectors or managers engage in “oppressive” actions . . . when they 
abuse their authority over the corporation with the intent to harm the 
interests of one or more of the shareholders, in a manner that does not 
 195.  Id. at 378 (discussing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 7.05–.06 (West 1980) 
(codified at TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 11.404(1)(C), 11.405 (West 2017))).  
 196.  Id. at 380.   
 197.  See id. at 382.  
 198.  Id. at 381–84. Also notable was the court’s decision to organize the misconduct
in two separate parts. In addition to affirming the buyout as the remedy for the oppressive 
efforts to deny the minority’s ownership, it also awarded damages for “informal 
dividends” the majority paid itself through a profit sharing plan that did not include the 
minority and for waste of corporate assets. See id. at 384–85. Of course, siphoning 
corporate assets can be a breach of fiduciary duty, but it is notable that the court affirmed 
a direct award of damages without further explanation of whether the “informal 
dividends” were wrongful as a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation or as a breach 
of a direct duty to the minority. See, e.g., id. As the Ritchie court would later observe, the 
relevant Texas statute relaxes the direct-derivative distinction in certain closely-held 
corporations. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.563(c); Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 880–
81. 
 199.  Moll, supra note 190, at 40–50 (collecting cases representing Texas’s minority 
oppression doctrine); see also Douglas K. Moll, Majority Shareholder Oppression in 
Texas Close Corporations: Majority Rule Isn’t What it Used to Be, 1 HOUST. BUS. & TAX 
L.J. 12, 15–18 (2001).   
 200.  Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 877, 891.   
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comport with the honest exercise of their business judgment, and by 
doing so create a serious risk of harm to the corporation.201
Critically, the court placed the analysis of oppression under the 
statute within the framework of general corporation law, affirmatively 
interlinking any definition of oppression with the requirement of harm to 
the corporation, and not merely to the minority.202 The court likewise 
declined to establish a common law duty not to act oppressively toward 
the minority, which it compared to a fiduciary duty to individual 
shareholders.203 As the Delaware Supreme Court did in Nixon,204 the 
Ritchie court referenced Texas’s existing statutory protections for two 
types of non-public corporations, closely-held and close corporations.205
Finally, the court’s preference for contracting was stated as such: 
“[a]gain, we note that although [the majority and minority shareholders] 
did not enter into a shareholders’ agreement, they certainly could have 
done so, and by doing so could have avoided the current dispute.”206
Delaware and Texas remain in the minority in rejecting any 
independent doctrine of oppression of a close corporation minority 
shareholder.207 While the courts in Ritchie and Nixon expressed a 
preference for contracting, both courts also rejected the claim that the 
general corporation law was too inflexible to provide adequate remedies 
for intracorporate disputes resulting in hardship to minority 
shareholders.208 Furthermore, the Ritchie court made an observation not 
often discussed in the ongoing debate: the difficulty of developing a 
predictable procedural mechanism (direct or derivative action), doctrinal 
basis (statutory oppression, common law oppression, or heightened 
fiduciary duties), and remedy (dissolution, buyout, or money 
damages).209 Though evaluation of close corporation doctrine in its 
current form is beyond the scope of this article, the Ritchie court’s
observation is instructive in the crowdfunding context, where more 
complication with respect to closeness and exit is layered upon the 
existing close entity.210
 201.  Id. at 871.  
 202.  Id.
 203.  Id. at 890. 
 204.  Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993). 
 205.  Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 880–81.   
 206.  Id. at 881.   
 207.  See Ragazzo, supra note 8, at 1100. 
 208.  Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1381 (“The entire fairness test, correctly applied and 
articulated, is the proper judicial approach.”); Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 871 (framing the 
interpretation of the oppression statute in terms of business judgment and harm to the 
corporation).   
 209.  See Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 889–90, 890 n.60.   
 210.  See infra Section IV.B.   
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E. How Close is Close? 
Naturally, if courts are inclined to treat close or small, private 
corporations differently than large, public corporations, there must be 
some analysis for dividing them. The court in Donahue observed that 
“[t]here is no single, generally accepted definition” of a close 
corporation.211 Should the line be drawn at a certain number of 
shareholders?212 Does the nature of family or social relationships in the 
founding of the business play a role?213 Is “exit” the primary or 
overarching consideration?214 Most courts and commentators have 
utilized a definition of close corporation similar to the one announced in 
Donahue: “(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for 
the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation 
in the management, direction and operations of the corporation.”215
Nonetheless, it is doubtful one could find a corporation with, suppose, 29 
shareholders, where all of these shareholders are also shareholder-
officer-directors. Likewise, as Professor Moll has observed, disputes 
often arise after the shareholder who actively participates in management 
dies or gifts the relevant shares, making his or her heirs or donees mere 
shareholders.216 Exit remains the most acute issue, given that the 
complaining shareholder probably would not complain if he or she could 
sell the shares on an open market. But, there are enormous private, 
 211.  Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 
1975).   
 212.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(1) (2017) (limiting the number of 
shareholders in a statutory close corporation under Delaware law to no more than 30). 
While the statutory close corporation and the judge-made doctrine of close corporations 
are distinguishable, the statutory limitation is informative. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS.
CODE ANN. § 21.563 (West 2017) (limiting the number of shareholders in a statutory 
closely held corporation to fewer than 35).   
 213.  E.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) 
(social connections between co-venturers); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 
(N.C. 1983) (involving a family relationship between a father and his two sons). 
 214.  See generally Means, supra note 115 (proposing that judicial scrutiny of 
allegedly oppressive actions be calibrated based on the extent to which the minority 
shareholder maintains a voice in corporate affairs).   
 215.  Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511; Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 557–58; see, e.g.,
Douglas Moll, Majority Rule Isn’t What It Used to Be: Shareholder Oppression in Texas 
Close Corporations, 63 TEX. B.J. 434, 436 (2000) (discussing this common definition); 
see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 372 (contrasting the attributes of close corporations 
with public corporations).   
 216.  See Moll, supra note 7, at 961–62, 961 n.249 (discussing unique issues involved 
when a shareholder becomes a shareholder by gift or inheritance). Inheritance was also at 
issue in Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 583. Donahue’s widow, Euphemia, was the complaining 
shareholder and named plaintiff. Id. How could her “reasonable expectations” include 
employment, participation in management, and other such matters, when she had never 
been employed or participated in management prior to her ownership? See Moll, supra
note 7, at 961–62, 961 n.249.  
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illiquid corporations, such as Cargill, Inc., whose web of stock ownership 
is believed to comprise over 100 family-member shareholders.217 Most of 
these mere shareholders face not only the liquidity problems affecting the 
smallest of corporations, but also face voice problems because there are 
many more mere shareholders than can possibly be directors. 
The ongoing development of oppression doctrine—whether 
developed by judges, implemented by legislatures through enactment of 
statutory oppression remedies, or both—is premised upon the contrast 
between close corporations and public corporations in the context of 
intracorporate disputes. In all such cases, courts tend to focus on the 
“intimate, illiquid”218 nature of the venture. This dividing line between 
the impersonal and liquid view of the public corporation and the intimate 
and illiquid version of the close corporation is blurred, if not outright 
smashed, by the arrival of crowdfunding. Crowdfunded corporations, 
undoubtedly, will be illiquid, but with a much larger number of 
shareholders who will invest through the Internet. 
F. Blurring Again: The Close-But-Crowdfunded Firm 
A corporation utilizing equity crowdfunding transitions overnight 
from a close corporation to a corporation with many quasi-public 
shareholders. This transition raises the question: does a crowdfunded 
close corporation remain a close corporation? Or does equity 
crowdfunding result in the corporation becoming “large” or “publicly-
held”? Does “publicly-held” automatically mean that the corporation can 
no longer be “close”?
Generally, crowd investors will not expect employment or regular 
income from the business, and will not be placing their entire financial 
futures in a crowdfunded investment opportunity.219 It also is almost 
assured that they will not accumulate a large enough share of the voting 
stock to exercise any real power over corporate decision-making. On the 
other hand, the vision, role, and direction of the corporation will remain 
in the hands of the non-crowd shareholder-officer-directors and they will 
still maintain the closeness, blending, and blurring that existed prior to 
the arrival of the crowd. 
Additionally, neither founding shareholder-officer-directors nor 
crowd investors are likely to have real exit opportunities—even if the 
 217.  Gregory Meyer & Neil Hume, Cargill Guards Private Life in 150th Year, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ec6f88c2-e4ec-11e4-bb4b-00144feab 
7de.  
 218.  See Thompson, supra note 6, at 370.   
 219.  In part, this will be because the crowdfunding regulations place limits on total 
investments. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2) (2017) (setting aggregate investment limits 
based upon income or net worth).  
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arrangement is less intimate, it remains practically as illiquid as it was 
before. The shareholder-officer-directors’ original shares remain as 
difficult to sell as they were prior to the raise, and perhaps are not of the 
same class or character as the crowd shares.220 Furthermore, there is no 
legal or regulatory provision for secondary trading of crowdfunded 
shares.221 Along with the uncertain regulatory status of secondary private 
sales of crowdfunded shares, the transaction costs of individual-to-
individual sales of crowdfunded equity should be expected to be 
relatively high—at least as high as the costs to the corporation and the 
individual shareholder of replacing a shareholder-officer-director. Even 
if some shareholder-officer-directors may have sufficient bargaining 
power to negotiate their exit at formation by negotiating the terms of 
bylaws, stockholder agreements, and other contractual provisions, crowd 
shareholders almost certainly will not.222 This mix of expectations and 
limitations on founding shareholder-officer-directors and crowd 
shareholders no longer fits neatly into either the mix of expectations and 
limitations for public corporations or for close corporations at present. 
IV. DISPUTES IN CLOSE-BUT-CROWDFUNDED FIRMS SHOULD BE
TREATED LIKE BIG INVESTOR DISPUTES
A round of crowdfunded investment transforms a small, private 
corporation with only shareholder-officer-directors into a corporation 
with a small group of shareholder-officer-directors plus a large class of 
mere shareholders. Though it is not necessarily as large—by 
shareholders or assets—as a traditional publicly traded corporation, its 
equity ownership no longer consists of only the founders or people 
bonded by family ties or personal relationships—the kinds of people who 
 220.  For example, the shares could be of the non-voting variety. See, e.g., Cleveland 
Whiskey, LLC, Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (Exhibit 5 to Form C) 6 
(May 19, 2016) (describing Class D units—the crowdfund unit—as non-voting). 
 221.  It is not clear that such a secondary trading platform would even be viable—
how liquid can a market remain if the original “crowd” begins selling their shares? Cf.
Oranburg, supra note 57, at 1. But see Steve O’Hear, Equity Crowdfunding Platform 
Seedrs to Launch Secondary Market, TECHCRUNCH (May 7, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/07/equity-crowdfunding-platform-seedrs-to-launch-
secondary-market/. Further, it is unclear whether a secondary market would ease exit 
concerns the way that public markets do. For example, if a crowd funds a lemon, then a 
secondary market simply would result in a crowd-wide death-spiral sell-off that may not 
solve the exit problem at all. 
 222.  Nonetheless, public shareholders have almost no bargaining power with respect 
to the terms of their stock ownership, and sometimes no voting power. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Whiskey, LLC, Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (Exhibit 5 to 
Form C) 6 (May 19, 2016) (describing Class D units—the crowdfund unit—as non-
voting); cf. Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2017) (describing 
public offering of “non-voting” shares).
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generally expect to be shareholders, officers, and directors of the 
corporation. Crowd shareholders will certainly appear more like public 
shareholders. Nonetheless, their relationships to their crowdfunded 
investments could result in a set of expectations that do not fit neatly into 
the large, public and small, private corporation paradigm described 
above. 
This Part begins with a clarification of the choice to make the close-
but-crowdfunded model the focus of this article.223 It proceeds to 
evaluate the expectations of crowd shareholders within the framework 
for public and close corporation shareholders set forth above.224 Much of 
the analysis of these issues is woven into a few hypothetical 
intracorporate disputes that could arise in crowdfunded ventures, which 
illustrate the similarities and differences in expectations.225 Throughout 
this Part, it defends this article’s primary claim: that courts deciding 
intracorporate disputes in close-but-crowdfunded firms should apply 
Delaware’s contract-focused approach instead of the special protections 
for non-controlling shareholders contained within many states’
oppression doctrines.226
A. Close-But-Crowdfunded as a Significant Slice of Equity 
Crowdfunding Activity 
Professor Seth C. Oranburg aptly observed that crowdfunding could 
fill a funding gap in the startup life cycle between the initial investment 
stage and the stage at which startups attract more substantial investment 
from angel investors and venture capital funds.227 The life cycle he 
describes involves heavy early-stage spending designed to build out a 
foundation for substantial later growth and long-term profitability; in 
contrast, he notes that small businesses, such as bike shops or food 
trucks, are expected to grow slowly.228 Undoubtedly, the high-tech feel 
of purchasing shares of stock through Internet portals associates 
crowdfunding with fast-growing, capital-burning tech startups. 
 Nonetheless, an outsized number of the first 50 crowdfund offerings 
represent permanently small enterprises, such as craft alcohol companies, 
many of them offering some form of current or future equity interest.229
One explanation is that there is some degree of irrational exuberance or 
 223.  See infra Section IV.A.  
 224.  See infra Section IV.B.  
 225.  See infra Section IV.C.  
 226.  See infra Section IV.A.–C.
 227.  Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 419–22.  
 228.  Id. at 406. Professor Oranburg also notes that small businesses typically are bad 
equity investments. Id.
 229.  See Leaf et al., supra note 35. 
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naiveté involved with crowdfunding—unsophisticated consumer-
investors are merely investing in a lot of lemons whose founders turned 
to crowdfunding as a last resort.230 Indeed, as Professor Darian M. 
Ibrahim notes, the unaccredited crowd associated with Title III 
crowdfunding is a bit of an enigma.231 On the one hand, the crowd could 
have specialized knowledge drawn from participation in a community of 
common interest—Professor Ibrahim provides the useful example of a 
crowd of video gamers possessing better information about the viability 
of a video game than angel investors who are not video gamers 
themselves.232 On the other hand, as best described by Professor Joan M. 
Heminway, crowds can be irrational and therefore may be expected to 
make unwise investment decisions.233 For the purposes of this article, it 
is irrelevant whether the crowd irrationally chases lemons or reveals 
actual wisdom through investing money. However crowd shareholders 
arrive at their investing decisions, when they choose to invest in a close-
but-crowdfunded venture, they become a mere shareholder in a 
previously very close enterprise. 
The clearest example of the close-but-crowdfunded venture may be 
a local craft beer brewery or other local artisanal food or beverage 
company. Crowd investment in a local craft brewery ties together affinity 
for the beer itself, the community of local beer enthusiasts,234 and 
perhaps a general affinity for local business. Craft beer brewing, much 
like running a restaurant, bike shop, food truck, or some other local 
business, is a small business activity. Founders of a craft beer brewery 
likely are shareholder-officer-directors and are probably bonded by 
friendship or family relationships. Prior to raising capital through 
crowdfunding, this type of venture would implicate existing close 
corporation doctrine. A company using crowdfunding in the manner 
proposed by Professor Oranburg may begin as a small corporation, but 
likely has no intention of staying that way.235 The expectations and 
motivations of crowd shareholders in permanently small, close-but-
crowdfunded corporations add an additional layer of complexity to the 
 230.  See generally Ibrahim, supra note 25.   
 231.  Id. at 597. 
 232.  Id.
 233.  Id. (citing Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the 
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 829–30
(2014)).   
 234.  Such an affinity apparently has existed for some time. According to a 2017 
report, London’s “Golden Lane Genuine Beer Brewery” raised the equivalent of £19 
million in 1805 from 600 “co-partners.” See MARTIN CORNELL, OFF3R, CROWDFUNDING 
TAPS BEER DRINKERS’ ENTHUSIASM: A REPORT ON CROWDFUNDING AND BREWERIES 2, 
https://learn.off3r.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Crowdfunding-taps-beer-beer-
drinkers-enthusiasm-1.pdf.   
 235.  See Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 405–06. 
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existing close corporation doctrine. As described below, this complexity 
counsels against its application. 
B. Fitting in with the Crowd 
At first blush, crowd shareholders appear much closer to large, 
public shareholders than to close corporation shareholders. Their shares 
come with no expectation of management positions or a directorship. 
There is no expectation of employment, and, in light of individual 
investment limits and offering size limits, it is doubtful any crowd 
shareholder will find himself or herself as having invested substantial life 
savings in a venture. The crowdfunded shares likely will have many 
default features of other public common stock.236 Even so, crowd 
shareholders do not have the same exit opportunities as public 
shareholders in widely traded corporations. These features of the 
relationship of the crowd shareholder with the crowdfunded corporation 
diverge from the features of the big investor, big firm relationship and 
the small shareholder-officer-director, small firm relationship, even 
before the unique features of crowdfunding come into focus. 
Adding to the combination of lower traditional expectations and 
minimal exit opportunities is the potentially unique set of expectations 
that arise in the crowdfunding context. These expectations flow from 
three identifiable themes in the burgeoning field of financial technology 
and technological innovation in the delivery of various services. First, 
many forms of crowdfunding, as described earlier in this Part, involve a 
substantial affinity for the product or service or the people promoting the 
campaign.237 This is especially true in donative crowdfunding, where the 
crowdfunder provides money in exchange for mere trinkets or because of 
a desire to purchase some yet-unfunded product.238 This affinity for the 
product or company is less likely to motivate investors in large, public 
corporations. For example, it seems doubtful that some significant subset 
of investors in the common stock of the Coca-Cola Company owns the 
stock merely because they enjoy drinking the beverage.239 Needless to 
 236.  This is not guaranteed, however, given the heterogeneous expectations across 
crowd investors and crowdfunded firms. See Verret, supra note 37, at 930–31.   
 237.  See, e.g., GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., supra note 73.   
 238.  See, e.g., Oculus Rift: Step Into the Game, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1523379957/oculus-rift-step-into-the-game (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2017) (describing an offering of posters, t-shirts, and prototypes depending 
on the amount of money donated).   
 239.  On the other hand, technology offerings such as SNAP, Inc. (the corporation 
that owns and operates the popular Snapchat mobile application) attracted significant 
investment despite having unique governance features—its IPO offered only non-voting 
shares, yet still traded at prices substantially above the IPO price of $17 for months 
following the offering. See Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2017) 
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say, they do not need to invest in Coca-Cola to consume Coca-Cola 
products, in the way that Marillion’s United States fan base needed to 
donate to a fund to see their favorite rock band live without traveling 
overseas.240 The local fans of a craft beer brewery may need to invest in 
their local brewer to ensure they continue enjoying their favorite local 
beverage. The local (and non-local) fans of the Green Bay Packers at one 
time needed to invest in the club either to ensure it remained in Green 
Bay or simply to own a piece of their favorite club.241
Second, many emerging technology-based companies, such as 
Uber, rely on a social network effect to generate a community around the 
product or service.242 The communities that emerge around these 
technologies ultimately come to shape the product or service itself. 
Community members may not join the community specifically to 
participate in the development of the product or service, but the nature of 
technology-based companies is to leverage the size and scope of the user 
community to fine-tune the deployment of the product or service.243
Similarly, early investors from the community of common interest often 
can become ambassadors or evangelists for the brand or product.244
Crowd investors, making their investments through web-based portals, 
likely could behave similarly to the community of users. Furthermore, 
technology companies are among those more likely to choose 
crowdfunding as a source of capital.245 Similarly, but on a much smaller 
scale, in the close-but-crowdfunded brewery, crowdfunders may play an 
active, if informal, role in in the development and execution of new 
varieties of beer. 
Third, the nature of close-but-crowdfunded entities suggests they 
will tap into a localized version of affinity and community. Doing so 
could result in disparate crowd shareholder expectations about the 
(describing sale of “non-voting” shares); see also SNAP Inc. Class A Common Stock 
Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ (http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/snap/historical) (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2017).  
 240.  See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.   
 241.  See GREEN BAY PACKERS, INC., supra note 73, at ii. 
 242.  See Byrne Hobart, The Uber of X Will Be Uber, MEDIUM (Mar. 5, 2017), 
http://bit.ly/2yDPIwm. This feature of crowdfunding may not be as prevalent in the close-
but-crowdfunded context. Building a network from which insight and scalability can be 
monetized is a feature of the fast-growing startup Professor Oranburg describes. See 
Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 406 (discussing the capital-intensive nature of 
building a “two-sided” market and using Facebook as an example); see also Kellen Zale, 
When Everything is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in the Sharing Economy,
53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 979–83 (2016) (describing the importance of network effects 
in the sharing economy).  
 243.  See generally Hobart, supra note 242.  
 244.  See Mitchell Hartman, Crowdfund My Startup, Please!, MARKETPLACE (May 
16, 2016, 4:04 PM), http://bit.ly/2hUnVzZ.  
 245.  See generally Leaf et al., supra note 35. 
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operation of the venture, and is most likely to involve the importation of 
crowd shareholders to the smallest group of shareholder-officer-
directors. Shareholder expectations could include the belief that the 
business will provide some tangible benefit to the community or conduct 
business in a certain manner. It may even include the expectation that the 
company will remain small and local. If some change in circumstances 
results in a change in the way these businesses operate, crowd 
shareholder expectations could be blunted, and, as the corporation 
remains close, there would be no meaningful exit. Drawing upon these 
three themes, the following sections illustrate some of the potential 
intracorporate disputes in crowdfunded ventures and the diversity of 
governance issues that may percolate within the ventures.246
C. Intracorporate Dispute Vignettes 
1. The Founders’ Quarrel 
The first potential source of intracorporate dispute in crowdfunded 
ventures is the traditional one. Let us return to the discussion of the local 
artisanal burger joint. Suppose, instead of The Burger Joint proceeding 
indefinitely as a close corporation with A, B, and C as shareholder-
officer-directors, the three founders decide to crowdfund The Burger 
Joint in the local community pursuant to their state crowdfunding 
exemption. The Burger Joint issues shares worth 10 percent of the equity 
and voting power in the corporation, while A, B, and C each retain 30 
percent of the equity and voting power. After inviting their new 
shareholder-only crowd investors to a “shareholders’ meeting”—no 
doubt featuring a lot of hamburgers—A, B, and C retire to the back office 
of the restaurant to bask in the glow of their successful capital raise. A
and B, much to C’s chagrin, begin discussing riding the wave of 
momentum of the crowdfunding campaign to expand the business, 
perhaps through franchising. C demurs, citing her lack of interest in the 
idea, as well as her belief that the energy of the crowd derives from The 
Burger Joint’s localness, as well as its quality hamburgers. As it did 
before, the rift between A, B, and C festers and grows, until A and B
decide that the only option is to terminate C’s employment and position 
as an officer with the corporation. Shortly thereafter, at the next annual 
meeting, A and B vote their shares to elect only themselves to the board 
of directors, thus ending C’s tenure as a director of The Burger Joint. The 
Burger Joint, of course, has never paid a dividend to its shareholders, 
 246.  As Professor Verret observed, crowdfunding illustrates the substantial need for 
governance flexibility, as firms have varying governance needs. See Verret, supra note 
37, at 938–41.   
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and, like many small corporations, distributes returns to its shareholders 
through salaries and benefits to shareholder-officer-directors.247
Co-founder C, now unceremoniously removed from her 
employment and directorship, watches her substantial financial interest 
in the corporation evaporate. Certainly, her investment in the venture has 
value, but she is locked out of realizing any of the return without her 
salary. Suppose C seeks redress through a lawsuit against A, B, and The 
Burger Joint. The animating theory of her suit would be that A and B
caused The Burger Joint to terminate her and remove her from the board 
in contravention of her reasonable expectation of continued 
employment.248 In the absence of a clear statement in The Burger Joint’s
bylaws or a stockholder agreement, a court would have two options: 
follow existing oppression precedent and analyze C’s reasonable 
expectations in light of the course of her dealings with A and B to this 
point, or follow Delaware and decide the case on whether the action was 
fair in its entirety or made with sound business judgment. The 
fundamental disagreement between the views expressed by the court in 
Meiselman and the court in Nixon is over the practicability of pre-dispute 
contracting. The court in Meiselman observed that the nature of close 
corporations was such that most minority shareholders would not have 
the bargaining power or inclination to pursue robust contractual minority 
protections.249 The court in Nixon relied upon the extensive menu of 
permissible contractual tools available under the law when it declined to 
“fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed 
stockholder buy[]out for which the parties had not contracted.”250 The 
decision to crowdfund, at minimum, creates a new opportunity to 
consider potential contractual options for the relationship between and 
among the founders and the crowd. This new opportunity to contract 
substantially undermines the justification for fashioning a broad remedy 
that the parties did not make explicit through contracting or the offering 
process. If the court chooses the latter option, several harms can result. 
For example, if the court orders that the corporation reemploy C, it 
will have to bear the cost of reemploying a dissident officer.251 Even if 
damages or a forced buyout were ordered against A and B individually 
 247.  Cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660–61 (Mass. 
1976) (describing shareholder-officer-directors’ salaries and the later cancellation of the 
salary paid to the plaintiff-shareholder).  
 248.  Such a theory could proceed either as a claim for breach of heightened fiduciary 
duties or oppression, or both, depending on the state. See supra Section III.C.1. 
 249.  Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558–59 (N.C. 1983).  
 250.  Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993).  
 251.  Front pay or back pay may also be a form of relief. Cf. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 
664–65 (ordering back pay jointly and severally against the majority stockholders, but 
permitting corporate assets to be “diverted” if appropriate). 
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(that is, not against The Burger Joint), the substantial alteration of A and 
B’s individual finances could impair their ability to infuse further capital 
into the business. Dissolution would be an equal if not greater harm—the 
crowd shareholders’ hopes of a return on their investment would 
evaporate into liquidation along with the interests of the founding 
investors. One potential argument supporting oppression doctrine is that 
granting a minority shareholder remedies against the majority will cause 
harm only to the majority whose direct oppressive acts caused harm to 
the minority. In a crowdfunded venture, the crowd, like any group of 
public shareholders, is innocent of any transgression committed by the 
majority or minority founders against one another. Therefore, given the 
absence of a substantial justification for the court to make inferences 
about C’s reasonable expectations or about the decision not to provide 
for minority protections in their corporate documents, the harm that 
could befall The Burger Joint if a court applied existing oppression 
doctrine counsels following Delaware’s approach. 
2. The Locked-in Crowd 
Consider a startup company designing a new household product, for 
example, some typical better mousetrap that one might see on an episode 
of ABC’s Shark Tank.252 When the forlorn founders walk off of the set 
with no shark investment, they turn to the crowd. Following a 
reasonably, but not overwhelmingly, successful raise, the founders have 
sold 15 percent of the business and raised around $100,000—more than 
enough to fill existing orders, do a bit more marketing, and increase the 
sales footprint for the product. Ultimately, however, the business never 
fully takes off, and the founders begin to allow the business to wither 
slowly. The crowd takes notice, but their 15 percent entitles them to no 
meaningful voting power and no ability to confront the withering 
strategy. Perhaps the founders even draw down the remaining corporate 
assets through the maintenance of their managerial salaries, even as sales 
decline and the business meanders toward inactivity. In the process, the 
crowd simply requests that the founders buy them out—that seems fair, 
after all.253 The founders, acting as directors, deny the request. Though 
not frozen out of employment or their life savings, the crowd likely has 
 252.  Shark Tank is a television program that consists of a panel of famous business 
experts hearing business pitches from small entrepreneurs. See generally About Shark 
Tank TV Show Series, ABC, http://abc.tv/1pqEUEb (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The 
experts, called “sharks,” decide whether and how to invest their own money in the 
businesses, and often provide feedback on the entrepreneurs’ pitches and business ideas. 
Id.
 253.  For example, Professor Moll proposes a default buyout as a check against 
opportunism by the majority. See Moll, supra note 7, at 900. 
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been frozen out of their initial investment, and may never see any return. 
At least in part, this freezeout derives from the founders’ otherwise 
formally permissible decisions to continue with payment of managerial 
salaries and to not expend any additional corporate resources toward 
growing the business. Like any other minority shareholder, the crowd is 
powerless to stop the majority shareholder-officer-directors and is denied 
the opportunity to liquidate in any meaningful way. Because exit and 
liquidity comprise an important part of the basis of oppression doctrine, 
crowd shareholders have a non-frivolous argument that the founders 
breached heightened fiduciary duties or otherwise oppressed them. 
If the crowd shareholders sue the founders alleging oppression, the 
argument likely would consist of the factual argument that the 
shareholder-officer-directors provided themselves liquidity from their 
investment in the corporation by paying themselves salaries, while 
excluding the crowd from any liquidity. The litigation likely would turn 
on whether the crowd had any reasonable expectation of liquidity. Of 
course, the crowd could lose merely because, as described throughout 
this article and in others, crowd shareholders should not expect many 
crowdfund investments to provide substantial, much less liquid, 
returns.254 But if the court awarded a buyout or dissolution, the founding 
shareholder-officer-directors would be personally liable for a substantial 
financial award to the crowd shareholders. 
The risk of potential personal liability for otherwise corporate 
actions may be defensible in the context of a close corporation, where the 
expectations of the small number of shareholder-officer-directors are 
discernable and the causal link between the breach and the harm is clear. 
As noted, the crowd is a group of individuals with potentially widely 
different expectations. Thus, the proof of the causal link between the 
shareholder-officer-directors continuing to pay themselves salaries while 
the corporation withered is more tenuous as applied to the crowd. Yet 
again, the crowdfunding process created a new opportunity for the 
parties to set the terms of their relationship. If a “crowd buyout” was 
contemplated, it could be created within the framework of the offering—
in the same way that future equity interests are being developed for 
crowdfunded ventures at present. 
 254.  See supra note 219 and accompanying text; see also Oranburg, Bridgefunding,
supra note 23, at 406 (describing equity investments in small businesses as questionable). 
See generally Ibrahim, supra note 25 (discussing the potential for a market for “lemons” 
which would result in irrational or poor investments); Heminway, supra note 233, 829–
30. 
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3. The Loyal Employee 
The first two vignettes set the founders against one another and 
against the crowd as a whole. Another possibility is that the founders 
could find themselves at odds with an individual shareholder from the 
crowd. Employment or managerial responsibility for the business is an 
ever-present theme in close corporation intracorporate disputes.255 Like 
in Wilkes, the typical case involves a dispute where most or all of the 
shareholders hold management responsibility or employment with the 
venture.256 Though this article has proceeded on the recognition that 
crowd shareholders typically will not expect employment with the 
venture, it is conceivable that employees could become crowd 
shareholders. Consider a venture with a class of crowdfunded shares that 
are not fully subscribed. As a holiday bonus, the principal shareholder-
officer-directors issue crowdfunded shares to a few loyal employees who 
are not officers. With employees mixed into the crowd, an employment 
dispute could become intertwined with the relationship between the 
founders and the crowd. Specifically, an employee-crowd shareholder 
who is terminated or otherwise leaves her employment may find herself 
with an asset she valued only as a part of her employment with the 
venture. 
The development of oppression doctrine often drew upon the 
employment expectations of minority shareholder-officer-directors and 
the relationship between the ownership of the stock and the position 
within the business. A terminated employee-crowd shareholder may 
come to believe that ownership of the stock is worthless if it is not 
connected to employment in the venture.257 For the purposes of this 
 255.  See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 657, 659–60 (describing the management and 
directorship responsibilities of the four co-venturers). 
 256.  See id.
 257.  See generally Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311 (N.Y. 1989) 
(providing a classic example of how employment, stock ownership, and financial 
participation in a business intertwine). In Ingle, a minority shareholder-officer-director 
purchased his shares subject to a stockholder agreement wherein the controlling parties 
(the business’s original sole founder and his sons) could repurchase his shares if the 
minority shareholder-officer-director “cease[d] to be an employee.” Id. at 1312. The 
controlling parties later terminated his employment and exercised the right to purchase 
the shares. Id. Though the plaintiff in Ingle pled the case as a wrongful termination, the 
driving force of his argument was that his status as a non-controlling close corporation 
shareholder prohibited his termination because it resulted in his being deprived of his 
ownership and role in managing the business. Id. at 1312–13. Though the majority of the 
court ultimately denied relief, id. at 1314, the dissent made a persuasive case that some 
equitable remedy was appropriate to protect “expectancies” generated through his role as 
a “coprincipal” in the business. Id. at 1317. The plaintiff in Ingle did not challenge the 
buyout price, but the dissent suggested it was low under the circumstances, also 
implicating the possibility that the plaintiff expected the value in his investment to be 
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vignette, assume also that the corporation maintains key-employee life 
insurance policies for certain levels of management, such that if a key 
manager is discharged from employment, the corporation can utilize the 
policy to buy back the shares from the manager’s estate.258
In a suit by the loyal employee against the founding majority, the 
argument likely would proceed as a claim that the ownership of the 
shares came with an expectation of employment, as well as an allegation 
that one class of employee-shareholders (the key employees) receives 
liquidity upon separation, while the crowd shareholder class of 
employee-shareholders does not. Such would not be the case, of course, 
with the average crowd shareholder in the venture, but it would be the 
case of the loyal employee who received the crowdfund-share holiday 
bonus. The employee likely would lose if the court perceived the 
employee’s proffered expectation of continued employment as based 
solely on share ownership.259 Nonetheless, the employee could make a 
more nuanced argument—that the share ownership was a benefit of or 
compensation for employment that is worthless without the continued 
employment relationship. Likewise, a court may be tempted, in balancing 
the equities, to order the majority shareholders to buy out this single 
shareholder, the cost of which is much smaller than compelling the 
buyout of the entire crowd or the holder of a founder’s share of stock in 
the corporation. A court may be even less hesitant to do so where the 
corporation provides liquidity to one class of employees as a benefit to 
those in control and not to the other class. 
Similar to the prior vignettes, the mechanics of the crowdfunding 
process significantly weaken the justifications for taking an equitable 
approach instead of a contractual one: the parties can agree on whether 
and how liquidity will be made available and expectations of 
employment, stock ownership, and participation can be calibrated in 
express terms.260 Furthermore, even a small buyout would be harmful to 
through employment compensation rather than capital appreciation, dividends, or a later 
acquisition. Id. at 1316 n.1.   
 258.  Cf. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1370–72 (Del. 1993). Such a pre-
dispute arrangement is common in smaller corporations, not only for discharge or 
voluntary separation from serving as an officer, but also for the death of the key 
managerial employee. Id.
 259.  Cf. Ingle, 535 N.E.2d at 1313 (concluding that a position as a close corporation 
non-controlling shareholder does not abrogate employee-shareholder’s employment at-
will). 
 260.  For example, a number of technology companies, most notably Skype, grant 
equity purchase options as compensation under strict exercise and repurchase provisions, 
even to the point of reserving themselves the right to repurchase any equity shares 
purchased by the employee pursuant to the options. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Skype 
Not Alone When It Comes to Options, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 6, 2011, 1:03 PM), 
http://nyti.ms/2qvDKAB (describing a number of companies’ specific option programs).  
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the close-but-crowdfunded corporation, despite the fact that it might not 
be as drastic as dissolution or as costly as the buyout of a founder’s
share. As discussed previously, the major benefit of crowdfunding is the 
extent to which it can be used to open capital flows to small 
businesses.261 Judicial interference in the growth and development of the 
practice by imposing stricter standards of conduct on majority 
shareholders or applying statutory remedies expansively, as it would in 
the other vignettes, impairs crowdfunding’s potential. Further, such a 
rule would limit unnecessarily the ability of corporations and employees 
to reap the benefits of employee stock ownership.262
4. The Early Adopter 
The “Early Adopter” is a savvy consumer who perceived value in a 
product or service in its early stages, perhaps prior to its existence in 
physical form.263 A useful real-life example is the tale of the company 
Oculus and its virtual reality headset, the Rift, which raised $2.4 million 
on Kickstarter for development and production costs.264 After two quick 
rounds of venture capital (“V.C.”) investment of $16 and $75 million, 
Facebook purchased the fledgling company for $2 billion.265 Suppose 
that instead of the promise of a prototype, the Kickstarter “investors” had 
received equity amounting to ten percent of the company—a valuation of 
approximately $25 million. Accounting (quite roughly) for the dilution 
associated with the additional $90 million of the V.C. rounds, a $2 
billion sale to Facebook would have resulted in a valuation of $50 
million for the crowd investors. 
Many Oculus Rift crowdfunders felt they missed out on the deal of 
a lifetime, for quite obvious reasons.266 This disappointment suggests 
there could be some expectation of loyalty to early adopters or “fans” in 
crowdfunded ventures. But was the source of this anger so obvious? The 
loss of a piece of the financial return received by the founder was 
upsetting, but there was no reason to believe donating to a Kickstarter 
 261.  See generally supra Section II.B.   
 262.  For a general discussion of the potential benefits of non-managerial employee 
stock ownership, see Xin Chang et al., Non-Executive Employee Stock Options and 
Corporate Innovation, 115 J. FIN. ECON. 168 (2015).  
 263.  See Christian Catalini & Catherine Tucker, Seeding the S-Curve? The Role of 
Early Adopters in Diffusion 3 (NET Institute Working Paper, No. 16-02, 2016) (defining 
“early adopter” and discussing how technology companies may use a waitlist to identify 
them).   
 264.  For a thorough account of the tale of Oculus Rift, see Chaboud, supra note 50, 
86–90. 
 265.  Id. at 87–88. 
 266.  See, e.g., Joel Johnson, Oculus Grift: Kickstarter as Charity for Venture 
Capitalists, VALLEYWAG (Mar. 26, 2014, 8:46 AM), http://bit.ly/1ePlt6Y. 
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campaign would entitle the funders to any part of the massive transaction 
proceeds. Arguably, there was some combination of expectations that 
included more than money—some belief that Oculus Rift was supposed 
to stay small or true to some undefined values.267 At the outset, when 
Oculus was merely a startup in its founder’s garage, crowdfunders 
participated in the Kickstarter campaign hoping the company would 
succeed and mass-produce its innovative new technology, which the 
crowdfunders would then consume.268 They expected only to receive the 
product itself and perhaps engage with a community of like-minded 
enthusiasts.269 The expectation appeared to change dramatically once the 
small startup transformed into a multi-billion-dollar asset of one of the 
world’s largest technology corporations. Clearly, the view of the public 
corporation with shareholders motivated only by financial returns is 
inapplicable, and the view of the close corporation as a partnership 
would not be particularly helpful in explaining, much less resolving, the 
difficulty of the Oculus Rift scenario. 
A future company that follows a similar path to success in the way 
that Oculus did with the Rift could be an equity crowdfunded venture. As 
Professor Oranburg observed, crowdfunding could be a source of “gap”
funding between the early rounds of friends-and-family equity 
investment and the first major round of V.C. investment.270 For the 
purposes of this vignette, let us assume that a small technology 
corporation conducts a crowdfund offering to raise funds within the 
traditional V.C. gap.271 The expectation of the founders, of course, is that 
the crowdfund raise will provide Professor Oranburg’s bridge between 
the friends-and-family round and the first real attention from V.C. 
funding. For that reason, the crowdfunding raise is very small as a 
percentage of the outstanding equity—perhaps only five percent of the 
total equity is sold for $1 million. After all, the founders did not want a 
cluttered capitalization table when the V.C. funding attention finally 
arose. 
As with Oculus Rift, however, this corporation flies past any multi-
round, multi-year V.C. and private equity funding pattern. Rather, 
another Facebook offers to pluck it from relative obscurity for $1 billion. 
The crowd’s portion of the sale proceeds is, of course, substantial. Five 
percent of $1 billion is $50 million, a 5,000 percent gain. 
 267.  See Chaboud, supra note 50, at 88–89. 
 268.  See Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 
J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 3 (2014) (discussing the goals of funders of non-equity 
crowdfunding projects).   
 269.  See id. 
 270.  Oranburg, Bridgefunding, supra note 23, at 401–02. 
 271.  See id.
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In contrast to the other vignettes, litigation over a 50-fold increase 
in the value of one’s investment seems unthinkable. But is it less 
unusual, in light of the existing corporation law, that mere donors to 
Oculus Rift felt that they were subject to some unfairness? This vignette 
is less useful to illustrate how courts could decide a specific dispute 
within a close-but-crowdfunded entity. Nonetheless, the possibility of 
litigation or other impairment to goodwill in Oculus Rift’s situation—
where crowdfunders received no equity and could not have had any 
reasonable expectation of sharing in the proceeds from the Facebook 
acquisition—illustrates the heterogeneous expectations that may drive 
tensions in close-but-crowdfunded corporations. In fact, such tensions 
may be more prevalent in close-but-crowdfunded ventures than in soon-
to-be large ones such as Oculus. 
As Professor J.W. Verret observed, ownership features of 
crowdfunded corporations illustrate the potential demand for creative 
governance solutions and the emergence of them outside of the 
traditional securities law framework.272 The Early Adopter vignette, 
while unlikely to result in a traditional close corporation imbroglio over 
shareholder-to-shareholder duties or equitable remedies, illustrates the 
ways that crowdfunding can result in a demand for creative solutions to 
crowdfunding-specific governance issues.273 The demand for creative 
solutions is supplied by development and experimentation with 
contractual terms and structures that can be deployed based on the 
individual needs of each potentially-crowdfunded business. The close-
but-crowdfunded firm, then, is at the heart of Professor Thompson’s
question of how to allocate the solutions structure between contracting 
and judges.274
The major tensions in the tale of Oculus Rift are not only that the 
early adopters lost out on major financial returns, but also felt a sense of 
loss when the company abandoned its smallness.275 Equity crowdfunding 
by itself may be the initial solution, but how should a close-but-
crowdfunded firm with a group of early adopters manage the 
uncomfortable tension between their enthusiasm for the product or 
people and the ever-present financial aspect? Perhaps a more apt 
question would be: what happens when the local craft brewery decides to 
 272.  Verret, supra note 37, at 936–48.   
 273.  Cf. id.
 274.  See Thompson, supra note 6, at 403.  
 275.  See Chaboud, supra note 50, at 89 (noting that more than 80% of the comments 
left on the Kickstarter page were negative with respect to the Facebook deal).  
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sell to an international conglomerate such as Anheuser-Busch InBev?276
The first option, utilized in many technology corporations, is to establish 
non-voting or diluted-voting shares.277 In such a scenario, the founders 
maintain control over the venture, but still offer early adopters a greater 
financial stake. Another option is to issue crowdfunded shares in a 
convertible form—that is, the shares represent the above-discussed five 
percent of the corporation’s equity as long as the corporation remains 
close-but-crowdfunded or in the V.C. gap portion of its life cycle. But, if 
Facebook offers an extraordinary amount for the corporation, the shares 
can be converted to a larger financial stake. In contrast, many close-but-
crowdfunded ventures with no intention of becoming large might 
actually sell crowdfunded shares that provide more substantial voting 
rights. Thus, if InBev wants to buy the craft brewing company, the deal 
might involve having to address the non-financial desires of the crowd. 
Any of these contractual arrangements between founders and the crowd 
can mitigate and allocate the tension between founders and the crowd in 
an Oculus Rift-style scenario. Thus, this vignette illustrates the 
superiority of contracting for the purposes of expanding the universe of 
capital for entrepreneurs. In the age of capital markets innovation, 
freedom to organize firms in creative new ways is ultimately more 
desirable. 
D. Resolving the Tension: Small Crowd Shareholders as Big 
Investors 
The heterogeneous expectations and motivations of crowd 
shareholders illustrated above make crowd shareholders unique from an 
equity investment perspective. Crowd shareholders do not fit neatly into 
the mold of the close corporation owner, whose stake in a company may 
be derived from personal involvement in the business or a personal 
relationship with its founders. While some crowd investors undoubtedly 
will invest solely with investment returns in mind, there is reason to 
doubt this expectation will be the primary motivation in all crowdfunded 
investments.278 As described above, crowdfunded ventures inherently 
face massive risk of failure and a relatively long horizon to any payoff 
from an equity investment.279 Such equity is not a great candidate for 
 276.  See, e.g., Ronnie Crocker, Karbach to be Acquired by Anheuser-Busch InBev,
THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Nov. 3, 2016, 1:57 PM) http://www.chron.com/business/ 
retail/article/Karbach-to-be-acquired-by-Anheuser-BuschInBev-10590579.php 
 277.  Cf. Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 3 (Feb. 2, 2017) (describing 
sale of “non-voting” shares). 
 278.  See supra Section IV.C.4 (discussing the non-pecuniary influences in the 
Oculus Rift saga). 
 279.  See supra Section III.F. 
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many returns-focused investors, as the shares likely will not resemble 
robust, tradable, growth, or dividend-paying public equities that would 
attract such investors. Given the lack of a secondary market, they are 
unlikely to attract speculators looking to open and close positions 
quickly. 
As illustrated above, the close-but-crowdfunded Burger Joint, or 
some other craft food and beverage concept, may be the quintessential 
crowdfunded venture.280 Such corporations, once crowdfunded, will 
retain numerous features prevalent in close corporations. Investors in 
these ventures are not venture capitalists searching for the next unicorn, 
but perhaps are investing for personal aesthetics, as do many Packers 
fans. With this volatile mix of expectations, closeness, and lack of exit, 
existing oppression doctrine may become a theory upon which 
intracorporate litigation can emerge. Nonetheless, it is even more 
difficult to apply than usual,281 not to mention less justified. 
Courts faced with oppression claims from minority shareholders in 
close-but-crowdfunded ventures without determinative provisions in the 
charter, bylaws, or stockholder agreement have two options to avoid 
“untempered application”282 of oppression doctrine in the crowdfunded 
venture. First, a court could conclude that the entity is no longer close 
and require the complaining minority shareholder to assert a claim that 
could be brought by a public shareholder for director self-dealing or lack 
of care.283 This option may be the best for the frozen-out founder or the 
employee. In such a claim, simply articulating a reasonable expectation 
of employment along with stock ownership should be insufficient—that 
is, the act of the directors must be shown to be harmful, unjustified self-
dealing, or demonstrating a lack of care that causes more harm to the 
corporation than would providing a remedy. 
Second, even if a court wishes to identify the close-but-
crowdfunded corporation as one subject to oppression doctrine, it should 
greatly circumscribe the range of reasonableness within the reasonable 
expectations analysis. With a very small number of shareholder-officer-
 280.  See Leaf et al., supra note 35 (observing that 8 of the first 50 crowdfund 
offerings were in the alcoholic beverage industry). 
 281.  As the Ritchie court observed, oppression doctrine is a bit difficult to apply in a 
consistent and certain manner. See Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 889, 890 n.60 (Tex. 
2014).  
 282.  See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 
1976). 
 283.  Cf. Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 871 (requiring the minority to prove that the majority 
abused its business judgment in a manner that harmed the corporation); Nixon v. 
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1375–76 (Del. 1993) (applying the entire fairness analysis 
where the corporation established an ESOP for certain controlling employee-shareholders 
and not the minority non-employee shareholders). This could also implicate the question 
of whether such a claim could be direct or derivative.  
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directors, a court’s ability to recreate and evaluate an individual 
investor’s expectations is defensible, if debatable. Furthermore, in these 
cases, the court can fashion a remedy in a less restrictive manner. Such 
an approach would not be possible with a group of crowd shareholders 
with diverging expectations about their investment and the company in 
which they invested. Articulating any version of a reasonable expectation 
of a crowd shareholder outside the view of the ordinary public 
shareholder would serve to frustrate the most valuable purpose of 
crowdfunding: opening channels for new capital for the formation and 
expansion of small businesses. Likewise, articulating a reasonable 
expectation of a founding shareholder-officer-director—perhaps one who 
voted against crowdfunding altogether—is fraught with the risk of 
damaging the crowdfunded firm. Finally, while a substantive evaluation 
of oppression doctrine in its current form is beyond the scope of this 
article, it is enough to say that the concerns that the court in Ritchie
articulated are even more acute in the crowdfunding context, where 
identifying and evaluating the determinative facts about the relationship 
between and among the founders and the crowd is even more 
complicated than in a corporation with only three or four players.284
To be sure, as it has been throughout the life of oppression doctrine, 
some wrongs may be left without a remedy. But, overall, discovering the 
full potential of crowdfunding as an investment mechanism should result 
in gains that are worth this cost. 
V. CONCLUSION
Equity crowdfunding is just one part of a larger trend of 
experimentation and disruption brought about by technological 
innovation in the financial space. New technologies are driving new 
modes of finance for businesses of all shapes and sizes at a feverish pace 
across the United States and the world. This article represents an early 
effort at addressing the myriad of corporate governance issues that likely 
will percolate through courts as crowdfunded ventures become more 
common. 
One likely place to find tension from the emergence of equity 
crowdfunding is in the relatively small corporation with relatively few 
founding shareholders—some or all of which may also be directors, 
officers, and employees. Courts in many jurisdictions provide special 
protections to non-controlling shareholders in close corporations to 
shield them from the harsh outcomes of many intracorporate disputes. 
Two primary justifications underlie these doctrines. First, history and the 
 284.  See Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 889, 890 n.60 (noting the difficulty in applying 
oppression doctrine even within its traditional context); supra Section IV.C & D.  
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experience of small business disputes suggest that personal or family 
relationships among the principal actors in a business often result in 
minority shareholders relying on trust instead of explicit contractual 
protections, not to mention forgoing the expense of hiring lawyers to 
negotiate such protections during the business’s planning phase. Second, 
in the absence of such contracting and the sophistication it suggests, 
courts can fairly infer that a minority shareholder has reasonable, but not 
contracted for, expectations of financial or managerial participation in 
the business based upon the course of the parties’ dealings with one 
another, and that it is appropriate for courts to give those expectations 
effect through its equitable powers. 
Once such a small business uses equity crowdfunding, the 
justifications for these protections become questionable. First, the 
mechanics of the crowdfunding process create both the incentive and 
opportunity for the founders to contract for whatever terms they believe 
best protect themselves and their business, and to decide upon what 
terms they will offer equity to the crowd. Second, and similarly, the 
crowdfunding process undermines the inference that there are unwritten, 
yet reasonable, expectations about any shareholder’s role in the venture.
Moreover, the heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory expectations 
crowd shareholders may have regarding their participation in the venture 
can further cloud the question of whether any given set of shareholder 
expectations is reasonable. In combination with the lack of exit or voice 
already prevalent in close corporations, similar iniquities in close-but-
crowdfunded firms might lead to judicial skepticism of the sort that gave 
rise to the existing division in treatment of public and close corporations. 
To resolve the tension created by equity crowdfunding, courts 
should apply the contract-focused approach exemplified in Delaware’s
rejection of oppression doctrine. Requiring all parties to bargain and 
contract for minority protections and other governance matters is a 
superior solution to the unique issues presented by close-but-
crowdfunded firms, as well as any issues that are common to ordinary 
close corporations and crowdfunded close corporations. Using this 
approach instead of the equitable reasoning underlying oppression 
doctrine provides the flexibility needed to accommodate the 
heterogeneous expectations emerging with crowdfunding and financial 
technology more broadly. Crowds that invest in small ventures are still 
big—thus, big crowds in small ventures should be analyzed more like the 
big crowds that invest in big ventures. 
The Big Crowd and the Small Enterprise: Intracorporate Disputes in the Close-But-Crowdfunded Firm, by 
Martin Edwards, published in the Penn State Law Review, 122 Penn. St. L. Rev. 411 (2018).
